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Abstract
Information protection is a key issue for the acceptance and adoption of pervasive
computing systems where various portable devices such as smart phones, Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs) and laptop computers are being used to share information
and to access digital resources via wireless connection to the Internet. Because these
are resources constrained devices and highly mobile, changes in the environmental
context or device context can affect the security of the system a great deal. A
proper security mechanism must be put in place which is able to cope with changing
environmental and system context.
Usage CONtrol (UCON) model is the latest major enhancement of the traditional
access control models which enables mutability of subject and object attributes, and
continuity of control on usage of resources. In UCON, access permission decision is
based on three factors: authorisations, obligations and conditions. While authorisa-
tions and obligations are requirements that must be fulfilled by the subject and the
object, conditions are subject and object independent requirements that must be
satisfied by the environment. As a consequence, access permission may be revoked
(and the access stopped) as a result of changes in the environment regardless of
whether the authorisations and obligations requirements are met. This constitutes
a major shortcoming of the UCON model in pervasive computing systems which
constantly strive to adapt to environmental changes so as to minimise disruptions
to the user.
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We propose a Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control (CA-UCON) model
which extends the traditional UCON model to enable adaptation to environmental
changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access. Indeed, when the authorisa-
tion and obligations requirements are fulfilled by the subject and object, and the
conditions requirements fail due to changes in the environmental or the system con-
text, our proposed model CA-UCON triggers specific actions in order to adapt to
the new situation, so as to ensure continuity of usage.
We then propose an architecture of CA-UCON model, presenting its various
components. In this model, we integrated the adaptation decision with usage deci-
sion architecture, the comprehensive definition of each components and reveals the
functions performed by each components in the architecture are presented.
We also propose a novel computational model of our CA-UCON architecture.
This model is formally specified as a finite state machine. It demonstrates how the
access request of the subject is handled in CA-UCON model, including detail with
regards to revoking of access and actions undertaken due to context changes. The
extension of the original UCON architecture can be understood from this model.
The formal specification of the CA-UCON is presented utilising the Calculus of
Context-aware Ambients (CCA). This mathematical notation is considered suitable
for modelling mobile and context-aware systems and has been preferred over alter-
natives for the following reasons: (i) Mobility and Context awareness are primitive
constructs in CCA; (ii) A system’s properties can be formally analysed; (iii) Most
importantly, CCA specifications are executable allowing early validation of system
properties and accelerated development of prototypes.
For evaluation of CA-UCON model, a real-world case study of a ubiquitous
learning (u-learning) system is selected. We propose a CA-UCON model for the
u-learning system. This model is then formalised in CCA and the resultant specifi-
cation is executed and analysed using an execution environment of CCA.
iii
Finally, we investigate the enforcement approaches for CA-UCON model. We
present the CA-UCON reference monitor architecture with its components. We then
proceed to demonstrate three types of enforcement architectures of the CA-UCON
model: centralised architecture, distributed architecture and hybrid architecture.
These are discussed in detail, including the analysis of their merits and drawbacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Objectives:
• Present an introduction and motivation of this research.
• List the research questions.
• Present the research methodology.
• Give the thesis structure.
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1.1 Introduction and Motivation
Ubiquitous environments use a wide variety of devices such as mobile phones, lap-
tops, wearable computers, embedded computing devices and hardware sensors. These
devices employ wireless and/or wired networks, which have differing limitations in
terms of power consumption, memory size and computational speed [2]. These net-
works can be incorporated and interact with each other in order to produce adaptive
services, which are provided depending on the present context of the user, the envi-
ronment and the system. Many new applications are now taking advantage of the
ubiquitous computing paradigm, facilitating the creation of smart homes, health
systems, smart vehicles, etc. One of the most significant features of ubicomp is that
it is ’context-aware’ [57].
The concept of a context-aware system is that the system is able to sense its
surrounding environment (the context) and can react accordingly. The widely ac-
cepted definition of context was given by [24] as, "any information that can be used
to characterise the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that
is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including
the user and applications themselves." Thus, the three functions that must be in-
corporated into a context-aware system are: (i) sense the environment, i.e. context;
(ii) process any change in the context; and (iii) adapt to the new context.
Various modern technologies are being exploited in networks and computing,
leading to the further development and increased use of ubicomp, and facilitating
a variety of ’convenience applications’ [77]. However, this increase in ubicomp has
introduced new security challenges, as information can be accessed and shared by
2
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users anytime and anywhere. Therefore, access through adaptive services and smart
devices must be protected by an efficient access control system. Traditional access
control models, such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) and Role Based Access Control (RBAC), were designed for tradi-
tional computing environments and accordingly have certain boundaries; these limit
their adoption and utilization in ubicomp environments. For example, the access
decision in traditional access control models is based on static attributes, which
makes them unsuitable for dynamic environments where the context of the user and
environment must be considered in any access decision [102].
The Usage Control (UCON) model is the latest major enhancement to tradi-
tional access control models; it enables mutability of subject and object attributes,
and continuity of control on usage of resources [73]. UCON has a condition com-
ponent, which can sense and capture the context, but it cannot react and adapt to
the new situation depending only on this context. Therefore, UCON is not wholly
appropriate for dynamic environments such as in ubicomp, where the context can
change frequently; this would affect the access decision for a subject who requests
access to an object. Thus, UCON needs to be further enhanced to make it an adap-
tive model, i.e. one that interacts with the changing environment and adapts to any
new situation in order to ensure continuity of service.
In this motivated example, We assume a vehicle equipped with smart system that
is able to connect wirelessly to any network and permits user to download music or
video services. We assume that the system is able to sense the bandwidth of network
connection when the user requesting the downloading music or video services .So
the condition for downloading this service is that the bandwidth must be high. If
the user wants to download the service, the system will check the authorization
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
and the obligation and the condition of the current request. So if the authorization
and obligation are met but the condition is not met which means in this case the
bandwidth is low, the system will deny the access. In this case the need for adaptive
model that adapts to new situation by do the action (e.g. slowdown the car speed)
in order to get the high bandwidth and continue the access to the user is important.
1.2 Problem Description and Research Question
Producing an adaptive usage control model that is compatible with UbiComp en-
vironments is a challenging task. A ubicomp system must be able to adapt its
behaviour based on its environment. Thus, it must respond to change in current
context if it is to deliver an adaptive service. The security system that is utilized
in an ubicomp environment (in order to control access in adaptive services) must
accordingly be context-aware.
Many access control models have been proposed to suit different aspects of ubi-
comp environments. Most of the proposed models and architectures have been built
on traditional access control models, such as RBAC [26][62]. Some researches have
been conducted in an attempt to extend the UCON model in order to build an
adaptive model that is appropriate for the ubiquitous environment [113][39].
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing extensions to access
control models, particularly UCON, has completely solved this issue in the ubiqui-
tous environment, where context-awareness is a vital aspect of any ubicomp system,
as the context is constantly changing. Thus, it is essential that an adaptive access
control model (that is better suited to the ubiquitous environment) be developed in
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order to remedy the limitations of traditional access control models.
In this thesis, we present a new usage control model, one that is adaptive
and context-aware, called Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control model (CA-
UCON in short). This new model ensures three features: (i) data protection, (ii)
enhanced service quality; e.g. ensuring the continuity of usage despite change in the
environment and (iii) keeping explicit interactions with the user at a minimum.
The overall and key research question can thus be presented as follows:
How can an adaptive usage control model (context-aware) solution,
one that seamlessly suits a dynamic computing environment (ubicomp),
be produced?
The main aim of this research is to address the question above in an efficient
manner. However, in order to answer this research question, three sub-questions can
be formulated as follows:
• How can the adaptation process be integrated into the usage control model?
• How can the new model be formally analysed using a suitable formal notation?
• How can an adaptive usage control model be enforced in ubiquitous environ-
ments?
1.3 Research Methodology
The research methodology employed in this thesis is a standard scientific research
technique (Constructive method), in which novelty is developed through an innova-
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tive architecture, model or technique. Having expert knowledge in this particular
field is vital if novelty is to be developed, and the literature will be key to this.
Accordingly, the proposed approach is comprised of five work packages; the first is
a literature review, and the second focuses on the proposed architecture. The third
work package presents the suitable formal specification, and the fourth demonstrates
different enforcement architectures for an adaptive model. The last work package
concentrates on the evaluation of the work [42].
• Work package 1: Research background
The research background mostly comprises a literature review, which involves
assessing all the aspects associated with the research question. Various re-
sources are utilized, such as digital libraries, publications, journals, articles,
etc.
• Work package 2: Architecture
This work package presents the proposed architecture to capture the aim of this
research, as formulated in the research question. Throughout this phase, the
research explores context-aware access control models and their boundaries in
order to identify the objectives and requirements of the proposed architecture;
it also describes its contribution to the field.
• Work package 3: Formal specification
This work package explores the available formal methods in order to generate
specifications for the context-aware and adaptive usage control model, and
elaborates the appropriate mathematical notations. Thus, the selected formal
method is utilized to specify various aspects associated with the remit of this
thesis.
• Work package 4: Enforcement architecture
6
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In this phase, the research investigates the different enforcement architectures
on which the adaptive model can be enforced. Then, it studies the most
appropriate reference monitor and explains its components.
• Work package 5: Evaluation
In the final phase, a real-world case study of ubiquitous learning is selected,
and the discussed formal method is applied to formalise this case study. The
properties of the context-aware and adaptive usage control model are analysed,
through the execution environment of the aforementioned formal method.
1.4 Criteria for Success
Satisfying the criteria of the research in this thesis is achieved as follows:
• The research questions posited at the commencement of this work must be
met.
• A study demonstrating how our proposed architecture is distinct from others
must be presented.
• An analysis of the proposed system using CCA.
• A study that illustrates the appropriate enforcement architecture must be
presented.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This section describes the outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis based on
the aims of this research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Firstly, an overview of traditional access control models is presented in this chapter.
It begins with a definition of access control, describing different access control mod-
els, and explains their differences. This chapter then illustrates the Usage Control
(UCON)model and investigates the distinction between this model and the tra-
ditional access control models. Moreover, it examines the conceptual model and
the family-core model of usage control. Subsequently, it provides an overview of
ubicomp systems and context-aware systems. It provides a definition for context,
and examines context models, context-aware systems and the properties of ubiq-
uitous systems. In addition, a definition of adaptive systems and adaptation in
ubicomp systems are presented. Then a various aspects of adaptation approaches
are presented. Finally, related works on context-aware access control are presented.
Different attempts to extend access control models, particularly UCON model are
assessed.
Chapter 3: Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control Model (CA-
UCON)
This chapter proposes a novel context-aware and adaptive usage control architec-
ture, which extends the Usage Control (UCON) model. It enables the adaptation
to environmental changes with the aim of preserving continuity of usage in a per-
vasive computing system. It then describes the computational model of CA-UCON
as a Finite State Machine (FMS), depicting how a subject’s request to access an
object is handled in this model. This chapter also provides formal definitions of the
two newly introduced adaptation models within the CA-UCON model. Finally, it
presents the expressive power of CA-UCON, which the UCONmodel can be specified
in CA-UCON model, and so all the access control models that can be represented
8
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in UCON (such as RBAC, MAC, DAC and DRM)
Chapter 4: Formal Specification of the CA-UCON Model
This chapter is separated into three parts. The first part illustrates the selected
formal method; it presents CCA. CCA has been proposed and is considered an ap-
propriate mathematical notation for modelling mobile applications that are context-
aware. The second part shows the ambient-based model within CA-UCON, which
can model any entity in a system as ambient. The final part presents the formalisa-
tion of the CA-UCON model in CCA.
Chapter 5: Case Study
This chapter is based on a ubiquitous learning (u-learning) system as a case study;
it explains in detail the requirements of a u-learning system. These requirements are
then modelled in CA-UCON. The u-learning system is then formalised in CCA and
executed. It is used to analyse the behaviour of the underlying CA-UCON model.
These are done via devising scenarios in a u-learning system and executing them in
order to assess the behaviour of CA-UCON in a changing context.
Chapter 6: Enforcement Architecture
This chapter presents the architecture of the CA-UCON Reference Monitor (CA-
UCON RM) and explains all included components. Then, it investigates the en-
forcement architecture of the CA-UCON model by demonstrating three types of en-
forcement, which are known as Centralised Enforcement Architecture, Distributed
Enforcement Architecture and Hybrid Enforcement Architecture. Moreover, this
chapter details the differences between these architectures and presents the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each architecture. Finally, some examples are illustrated
in order to present the efficacy of the enforcement within CA-UCON under different
9
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architectures.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presents a summary of the research in this thesis as well as the final
results. Then, it suggests future work that may build upon the boundaries of our
model.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Objectives:
• Present a literature on Traditional Access Control Model.
• Investigate Usage Contol Model (UCON).
• Explore Pervasive (Ubiquitous) Computing, Context,Context-aware System.
• Show Adaptive system, Adaptation in Ubiquitous system, Adaptation ap-
proaches.
• Present some existing Context-aware access control model.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we give an account of background of the area of access control models.
We begin with a definition of access control, introducing a traditional access control
models, and follow with an explanation of the distinction between these models. In
addition, we illustrate the usage control model (UCON) and describe the differences
between this model and the traditional access control models. The conceptual model
and family-core model of UCON are presented. An overview of Ubicomp systems and
context-aware systems are shown, including the definition of context, context model
and context-aware systems. Then, we present a different adaptation approaches and
make the comparison between these approaches in order to select the most suitable
approach for our work. Finally, related work on extension of access control to include
context information in access decision are presented.
2.2 Background
Important new challenges have emerged as a consequence of recent technological
innovations and advancements in the telecommunications, computing and networks.
Various devices, such as smart phones, personal computers and portable devices are
now being used to share resources and digital information, which make it difficult
to protect such shared digital resources against unauthorized accesses [12].
Researchers in the relevant areas have attempted to mitigate and resolve the
unauthorized access problem, and have made significant advances in the protection
of scientifically oriented data and information as well as in the overall information
security domain. Since the advent of the information security discipline, the infor-
12
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
mation security community has considered ’access control’ as a major information
security issue. Traditionally, access control concentrates on safeguarding computa-
tional resources against unauthorized access in a closed environment. The control
mechanism employed focuses primarily on identity and attributes of the recognized
client, or uses a reference monitor with specified authorization rules [72].
There are many ways to define access control; however, we can define it as the
ability to grant or deny access to a subject to a particular object or resource in order
to ensure protection against unauthorized access to particular digital information
or computer resources. Hence, the objective of access control is to ensure three
elements [53]:
Confidentiality: prevention and mitigation of the unauthorized exposure of a digital
resource.
Integrity: prevention and mitigation of unauthorized modification to digital re-
sources that could undermine their integrity.
Availability: ensuring access for authorized and authenticated subjects .
There are three main traditional access control models:
1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
2. Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
3. Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
13
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These models were developed based on a set of predefined authorization rules,
comprising ’subject’, ’object’ and ’operation’ for each and every entity in a digital
resource that needs access protection. Basically, these define what resources (ob-
jects) a user (subject) can or cannot access, and what actions the user is authorized
and permitted to execute (operation) on the resources that they are permitted to
access [94]. The focus of the traditional access control models is to protect digital
and computational resources within a closed security environment. However, the
recent rapid advances in complex computing systems have necessitated the intro-
duction of new security requirements, and hence the need for a more robust new
security mechanism [85].
The traditional security models do not and cannot sufficiently address all the
major problems and challenges that have arisen in modern computer network sys-
tems. More robust and flexible models are needed to ensure access protection for
modern digital resources. Furthermore, DAC is mainly responsible for controlling
access to objects; it does not control the information flow. MAC can control the in-
formation flow but may not be suitable for controlling the access to objects. RBAC
can control and administer access to digital information and other computational
resources in a closed and controlled organizational domain but may not be able to
do so if subjects are unknown in an open environment systems [95].
Another model, Trust Management, can be used in open environment systems to
control and authorize access for unknown subjects only when the entities accessing
are static and do not often change. Trust Management and the other traditional
access control models control access to objects on the server side [104]. Moreover,
studies have been conducted on access control issues and the usage of digital objects
before and after dissemination; this is known as Digital Rights Management (DRM).
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DRM opens up many opportunities for the commercial digital-information sector.
Hence, the majority of current DRM solutions concentrate on payment-based dis-
semination control but can be applied as well on non-payment based dissemination
[12]. However, as DRM and Trust Management have each focused on their own spe-
cific issues in terms of access control, a new Usage Control (UCON) access model
was recently proposed. UCON extends multiple aspects of the traditional access
control models, introducing two new aspects: mutability of attributes, and continu-
ity of the access permission decision [83].
One of the most rapidly developing areas in ICT is known as ’ubiquitous com-
puting’. It refers to the ever-increasing phenomenon of integrating and embedding
ICT tools in people’s daily lives and in the situations or environment in which they
live. This has been made possible by the ever-improving developments in the man-
ufacture of microprocessors, which now have built-in communication functions and
other amenities [77].
The new technologies that have being employed in networks and computing have led
to the development of ubiquitous computing, facilitating a variety of convenient ap-
plications [77]. The most significant matter in ubiquitous computing, which brings
new challenges, is security, where the information can be accessed and shared by
users anytime and anywhere.
Many researchers have attempted to solve security issues in ubiquitous environ-
ments, but none of them completely solves these problems. Thus, a new and effective
security mechanism must be put in place; one that is able to cope with changing
environmental and system contexts.[102]
15
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2.3 Traditional access control models
Throughout the history of computing and information security, there have been sev-
eral studies and efforts to facilitate and protect the access and the usage of digital
resources. As above and now in Figure 2.1, traditional access control models can be
divided into three: Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control
(DAC), and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)[86]. Despite the success of these
models in closed environments, the issue of access control remains a major issue for
information and system security in our modern cyberspace. Providers of digital con-
tent services and other relevant resources need to exercise control over accessibility
and usage of their resources in the sense of gaining the ability to determine who is
allowed to access a digital resource and what access rights they can have over the
objects available; this is the central issue in any access control model. [95].
Figure 2.1: Traditional Access Control [86]
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2.3.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary access control is defined as a denotation of restriction access to the
available resources or services, relying on the identification of authorized users [55].
Most operating systems today use the DAC model at the heart of their controlling
mechanisms. DAC provides flexibility in access control by devolving the protection
decision and the right to determine access to the user, who owns or has created the
object. The flexibility of DAC enables the object owner to discretionarily specify the
type of access privileges for a potential user. However, "any practical DAC scheme
must have significant constraints which can be best be understood in terms of the
layered construction of protection systems" [97]. In general, discretionary access
control models are concerned primarily with controlling users’ access to restricted
information resources.
2.3.2 Mandatory Access Controls (MAC)
Mandatory access control is a process, acting to restrict a user’s access to resources
based on ’access sensitivity’, which is defined for the object in terms of the informa-
tion objects that those resources contain; this entails a more formal authorization
in the form of clearance, which is needed by users to access such sensitive objects
[103]. "MAC bases the access rights on fixed regulations determined by a central
authority" [95]; it is concerned mostly with the control of information flow between
the different objects in a system. Moreover, the MAC security model is deemed to
have a better access control in terms of security to objects than DAC, as MAC can
control "indirect information flow". [28].
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2.3.3 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
In RBAC, users are given predefined access rights in the form of roles, which they
can assume and execute on the system; hence, this restricts a user’s access to other
objects, i.e. those that do not concern them or those for which access has not been
assigned. As the concept of ’role’ stems from individuals in an enterprise or orga-
nization, where each and every person has a specific role and responsibility, RBAC
facilitates modelling object access security from an enterprise or organizational per-
spective, by aligning the assigned roles with the roles that a subject is assigned to
within an organization or enterprise [68]. RBAC is used in commercial applications
as a viable alternative to the traditional models of mandatory/discretionary access
control, as it can align users’ access rights in a given system based on their assigned
responsibility in the organization [89][88].
2.4 Trust Management (TM)
Trust Management is another access control model, which is used in authorizing
unknown entities to have access to objects in an open environment. However, Trust
Management is most generally applied when the entities are static, which are not
likely to change over time. The concept of Trust Management was first proposed
by [13]. It is described as a process of "using a uniform method that describes
and explains security policy, security credential and trust relationship which is used
to directly mandate to the key safety operation" . Moreover, the widely accepted
definition of trust management was proposed by [76], stating that it "refers to the
acquisition, evaluation, and implementation of trust intention". Based on this def-
inition, the trust of subject in the object might be assessed utilizing mathematical
process rely on previous experience and can be amended continuously based on the
18
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behavioral result of object.
2.5 Digital Right Management (DRM)
DRM is one of many technology-oriented access control models. With the deploy-
ment of DRM, content owners can restrict and protect their digital contents before
distributing and forwarding them by creating usage rules for those contents[56].
Such usage rules may include assigning temporary versions (trial), content expira-
tion, content subscription, etc. DRM can be highly effective in protecting shareable
and distributable digital information in an open environment [52] [103].
2.6 Usage Control (UCON) Model
2.6.1 Introduction
This section discusses the basic principles of a new access control, known as Usage
Control (UCON); it was originally proposed by [73] to address issues in, and to pro-
vide various access control systems for, the new and modern computer applications
environment. UCON uses attributes to determine access permission to a controlled
digital information or computational resource based on three factors: authorization,
obligations and conditions. These elements shall be discussed in detail in the sub-
sequent sections. Moreover, UCON provides enhancements to existing traditional
access control models by taking into consideration two new aspects for any object
requiring access: mutability or changeability of attributes, and continuity of the ac-
cess permission decision. The concept of mutability refers to the fact that attributes
are not static; rather, they change intermittently, and hence the access permission
decision should be dynamic and continually re-evaluated and updated (as soon as
a new circumstance arises). The continuity of access decision ensures that any de-
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cision to permit and allow access to an object is made constantly both before and
during the access to an object [72].
2.6.2 Usage Control Conceptual Model
The Usage Control (UCON) model is known as a conceptual framework that pro-
vides a unified structure to protect digital resources. The UCON framework is not
introduced to substitute or replace existing traditional access controls, Trust Man-
agement or DRM. Instead, the UCON framework provides enhancements and thus
includes the existing access controls by applying two new access control concepts
mentioned above: mutability of attributes and continuity of access decision [78]. The
continuity of access decision in UCON ensures that the security policy is enforced
before and during access has been granted to an object. The UCON authorization
mechanism ensures that the granted usage access is revoked and terminated if the
object’s attributes change while the access is in progress and if the security policy
in place is not satisfied with any particular attribute change [112]. As mentioned
above, three factors are used to determine the access decision in the UCON model:
authorization, obligations and conditions. Authorization is a predicate that enforces
constraints on the attributes of both the subject and object when the subject wants
to access an object. Obligations are the expected sequence of actions that are re-
quired by the subject before and during the usage of a given object. Conditions are
a set of restrictions that are dependent on the environment of the access, which are
expected to be valid at the time of access and during the access period.
As an illustration of the three factors discussed earlier, a UCON security and
access policy may enforce aspects such as ensuring that a subject’s name is something
specific (i.e. authorization), that the subject may be required to sign an agreement
form before access, which must not be violated (i.e. obligations), and finally that
the object that needs to be accessed may only be accessed during official working
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hours (i.e. conditions) [110]. To design such an access control system, the first
action required is to identify the objects that need to be protected, then to identify
the subjects that could request usage or operation on the objects that have been
identified, and to identify all the possible actions that can be operated and executed
on those objects, and finally to identify all the access rights needed to execute the
identified actions on the objects [111].
2.6.3 Usage Control Components
The UCONABC model comprises eight key components (see Figure 2.2 ), namely:
subjects, objects, subject attributes, object attributes, authorizations, rights, obliga-
tions and conditions. Usage decisions are based on authorizations, obligations and
conditions; these are functional predicates that must be evaluated for each usage
decision [72].
2.6.3.1 Subjects (S) and Subject Attributes (ATT(S))
A subject is an entity who requests access to a resource; it must hold certain rights
of access to the target object or resource, must be able to commence the request
for usage, and consequently must be capable of executing the rights granted and
assigned to it . The subject or resource requester is mostly defined and represented
by its attributes, i.e. subject attributes [37]. The subject attributes, ATT(S), are
basically the capabilities and properties that describe the subject, which can be used
as a basis for any possible usage decision [79].
2.6.3.2 Objects (O) and Object Attributes (ATT (O))
Objects are basically the entities of interest to which subjects have predefined rights
of access and use. Object attributes, ATT (O), are descriptions and properties of
a given object, which could be used as basis in the provision for and making usage
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Figure 2.2: Usage Control Model [72]
decisions. The target objects to which subjects hold rights can be of a variety of
types: an object may be digital information, or computational, network or service-
oriented resources [40]. An object may be modified, shared or distributed by subjects
in an open computer network environment. Objects may also be original, derivative
or copied, or may be privacy or security sensitive (or otherwise). For example, access
usage histories of subjects are considered as derivative of an object. In UCON, non-
original objects (derivatives) are generated as result of using the original copy [38].
2.6.3.3 Attributes
Attribute is a commonly used concept in access control. For example, in the MAC
model, a security tag assigned to an object can be considered as an object’s attribute
and a user role is also considered a subject’s attribute in the RBAC model. The
mutability of attributes is also introduced in the current access control approaches,
but in most cases, a systems administrator control and force attribute updates. The
mutability of objects and subject attributes resulting from UCON usage processes
is considered the backbone of the UCON model. There are three different types of
attributes in UCON, namely: environmental attributes, object attributes and sub-
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ject attributes. Subject and object attributes were discussed above. Environmental
attributes are considered as system-oriented attributes, such a device platform, area
code, etc [74].
2.6.3.4 Rights
The concept of access right in UCON is the same as in traditional access control
models. The access rights granted to subjects are not predefined but rather are
granted on demand when a subject attempts to access an object, and the access
right granted is based on the subject itself as well as the object, the authorization,
the obligations, the conditions and the environmental attributes [60].
2.6.3.5 Authorizations (A)
Authorizations are defined as a key functional requirement that must be satisfied be-
fore granting a particular right of access to a digital object. There are various types
of authorizations, and broadly they are utilized in many different contexts, includ-
ing in the traditional access models. For instance, an authorization predicate may
require that a user who wants to access an object or resource must be 22 years old
or more, etc. Authorization predicates place conditions and constraints in the form
of logical predicates on both the subject and object attributes. Unlike traditional
models (which use pre-authorization), UCON authorization predicates are triggered
and evaluated both before (pre-authorization) and during (on-authorization) the
subject’s execution of assigned rights [85].
2.6.3.6 oBligations (B)
Obligations are also defined as functional predicates; they are used to confirm the
compulsory requirements that a subject must undertake before and during a partic-
ular usage process. The mandatory requirements here may be either pre-obligations
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(preB) or ongoing-obligations (onB). preB uses a Boolean function and returns ei-
ther ’true’ or ’false’ in order to determine whether or not certain pre-requisite actions
have been fulfilled before granting access; for instance, a user agreeing to provide a
log before listening to a music file, or a subject agreeing to provide personal infor-
mation on a form before reading a company’s free whitepaper, etc. onB represents
the ongoing-obligations that a subject must fulfil in order to ensure that a particular
predicate is active (continuously or periodically) while the permitted rights are being
executed or are in use. For example, a subject may be required to keep a particular
online advertisement active on the side while the subject is still logged on to watch
a free video. Subject or object attributes may or may not be used by obligations.
Attributes are useful for determining the types of obligations that may be required
for usage approval. In some cases, obligations require making certain updates on
subject attributes; those updates would likely affect both future and current usage
decisions. However, attributes are not utilized in making decisions in relation to
obligations; rather, they are only used to determine which obligations to select and
perform [112].
2.6.3.7 Conditions(C)
Conditions are defined as environmental restrictions that must be considered in the
process of a usage decision. They are not related directly to objects or subjects but
they do rely on environmental properties or attributes. The assessment of condi-
tion predicates may take place before granting access permission to a digital object
(pre-condition) or while the subject is using the object (on-condition). However,
conditions do not update object, subject or environmental attributes, and the sta-
tus value of conditions may be altered as a consequence of environmental amendment
[78].
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2.7 The UCONABC family core modules
In this section, we briefly discuss UCONABC family core models, which rely on
the combination of three decision factors described above (authorization, obliga-
tions and conditions), as well as on continuity of usage decision and mutability
of attributes. These core models were developed for the simple reason that they
concentrate largely on the enforcement process of usage decisions, rather than on
administrative issues. The ABC model functions (with the assumption of a usage
request on a target object and the decision to grant access rights) can be per-
formed either before or during the action and execution of requested rights. As
a side effect of usage decision, mutability of objects permits limited updates on a
subject or object attribute. Therefore, the UCON model identifies six core mod-
els, known as pre-authorization (UCONPreA), on-authorization (UCONOnA), pre-
obligation (UCONPreB), on-obligation (UCONOnB), pre-condition (UCONPreC) and
on-condition (UCONOnC). The models incorporate five components: subjects (S),
objects (O), rights (R), subject attributes (ATT(S)), object attributes (ATT(O)).
The notation allowed(s, o, r), means that a subject s is permitted to use a right
r on an object o. Moreover, the notation stopped(s, o, r) means that the access
will be revoked because all or some of the decision factors are no longer satisfied.
Attributes update can be achieved in UCON before the access (PreUpdate), during
the access (OnUpdate) or after the access (PostUpdate) [38].
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2.8 Ubiquitous (Pervasive) Computing
2.8.1 Introduction
One of the most rapidly developing areas in ICT is known as ’ubiquitous computing’.
It refers to the ever-increasing phenomenon of integrating and embedding ICT tools
in people’s daily lives and in the situations or environment in which they live. This
has been made possible by the ever-improving developments in the manufacture of
microprocessors, which now have built-in communication functions and other ameni-
ties [77]. There are many applications available for ubiquitous computing, including
healthcare, homecare, environmental monitoring, intelligent transport systems man-
agement and monitoring, etc. [105]was the first to introduce the term of ubiquitous
computing as a seamless integration of micro-devices into the daily lives of ordinary
people as well as specialists .
Moreover, developers in the field have been discussing and investigating pervasive
or ubiquitous computing since about 1993 [57]. Ubiquitous computing has been
defined in many ways but the most broadly used definition refers to it as a method
for enhancing the use of computers by users who cannot see them even though
there may be many of them accessible in the physical environment. The nature of
"environment" in ubiquitous computing differs from that in traditional computing
models, wherein the environment is represented as physical space, which is directly
supported by the relevant software and hardware to enable interactive messages to
be sent between users and that space [48].
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2.8.2 Ubiquitous System Properties
In reference to Figure 2.3, there are three main properties in ubiquitous comput-
ing (ubicomp) systems, namely, distributed computing, implicit Human Computer
Interaction and context-awareness, plus two other additional properties, namely,
autonomous and intelligent computing [80].
Figure 2.3: Ubiquitous Systems properties [80]
2.8.3 Ubicomp Technologies
Ubiquitous computing involves the convergence of three ICT areas, namely: com-
puting devices, communications and user interfaces [31][8][51].
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2.8.3.1 Devices
Personal Communications Services (PCS) devices come in varying shapes and sizes,
such as tiny handheld devices as small as mobile devices to near-invisible micro de-
vices that are embedded in everyday objects such as clothing and furniture. These
micro-devices have the ability to communicate and interact with each other seam-
lessly and intelligently. So, devices can be categorised as follows:
Sensors: these serve as a form of input device that function to detect and recognise
human commands, and to detect relevant changes in user behaviour as well as in
the environment.
Processors: there are functional components for interpreting and analysing the
inputs detected by the sensors.
Actuators: these are output devices that act in response to processed informa-
tion by making certain changes to the environment through mechanical or electronic
means, such as controlling air temperature (which is normally done by actuators).
Furthermore, the term may refer to devices that deliver processed information in-
stead of being devices that physically change the environment .
2.8.3.2 Connectivity
Ubicomp systems depend largely on the interaction of different independent elec-
tronic devices into a larger seamless computer network. The interlinking and in-
terconnectivity of these systems and devices may be achieved though wired (e.g.,
Ethernet/ADSL broadband) or wireless means (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth). The devices
themselves are equipped with the ability to select the most effective connectivity
mode at any given time. The development of ubiquitous computing relies mostly
28
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
on the extent of the interoperability and convergence of both wireless and wired
technologies.
2.8.3.3 User Interfaces
A user interface is the domain of interaction between a human user and an ICT
device. For example, in personal computers, there are various devices, such as a
mouse, a keyboard and a microphone, that are used to provide input data, while
visual display units, such a monitor or a projector, are used to provide the processed
output information. For ubicomp systems, different types of enhanced user inter-
faces are being developed constantly, with ability to sense and provide data about
users and the environment to a computer device for further processing. Interfaces
have recently been developed to accept touch as input data, and in the future, user
interfaces will be used to accept input data that may be visual, such as face recog-
nition or responses to human gestures; they may include other input types such
as sound and scent. Current ubicomp technologies have the potential to know and
recognize the user, in the form of the user’s expressed attitudes, behaviour or prefer-
ences, and subsequently they conduct changes in the physical environment to meet
the user’s specific needs. However, there are considerable engineering challenges in
designing and developing a computing system that can automatically adjust itself,
i.e. that can adapt or change as a result of unforeseen situations .
2.9 Overview of Context-Aware Systems
2.9.1 Definition of Term Context
Many researchers have attempted to define the word "context". The first authors
who introduced and defined the term context were [93]. They stated the first de-
scription of the context as identities of people, location and objects around. [67]
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has made similar description of previous one which define context as the users iden-
tity, environment, time and location. While [18] have made definition of context as
social, user’s physical, emotional or state of information. Another way of describe
and define the term context is by utilizing synonyms like (situation, Background or
circumstance)[14][6].
Moreover, a further definition was posited by [75], who considers context as be-
ing the conceptual and physical states of interest to some specified person, place
or object. Thus, context is basically information pertaining to the environment, as
stated in [81]. Even with all the definitions mentioned above, it remains difficult to
clarify the term context; however, arguably the best (and possibly the easiest defi-
nition to fully comprehend) was given by [24], who described it as "any information
that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person,
place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an
application, including the user and application themselves".
2.9.2 Context Model
The importance of the definition of context is that it identifies the precise data that
need to be stored, which in turn assists in developing a context model that has the
ability to define and store this context information in machine processable form.
[98] categorized context models as follows:
1. Key-value Model: this is one of the easiest forms for modelling context
information. Context information can be stored as attribute-value pairs; For
instance, name: John, age: 23, location: office, time: 2:30, and so on. However,
this model is limited in terms of being able to refine the structure so that it
can handle sufficiently powerful context information retrieval algorithms.
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2. Markup scheme model: this is another approach to data structure that can
be utilized to represent and exchange context information, based on markup
tags that are used on the stored data content and attributes. The markup tag
contents can recursively contain other markup tags.
3. Graphical model: in this model, the unified modelling language (UML)
is used because UML has a variety of efficient graphical tools. The generic
structure of UML is appropriate for context information modelling. This type
of context modelling is suitable for expressing Entity Relationships (ER) from
which ER models can be derived from it; these can be used as functional tools
to structure relational databases within the system architecture of context
management.
4. Object Oriented Model: the nature of context information is becoming a
problem in most context-aware systems because of their dynamism. Therefore,
the goal of using this approach is to encapsulate the details of context pro-
cessing at the object level and to access the context information only through
particular interfaces.
5. Logic based model: the descriptions of context in this approach are known as
expressions, facts and rules. The expressions also incorporate a set of varieties.
All logic-based models employ a high level of formality.
6. Ontology based model: the idea behind this type is to identify the context
and concepts as well as their interrelations. There are many examples for this
approach, but one excellent example that used ontologies to model context
information is the CoBrA system (Context Broker Architecture) [21], which
characterizes entities by offering a set of ontological concepts.
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The most appropriated context model approach for our work in this thesis is
object oriented model where The contextual information is embedded as the
states of the object, and the object provides methods to access and modify
the states.
2.9.3 Context-Aware Systems
Context-awareness is one of many wide areas in ubiquitous computing. Ubicomp
technologies allow for separation between users and devices, hence providing any-
time, anywhere by anyone computer usage. In order to be effective in the provision
of adequate services for users, software applications and services must know their
context and have the ability to automatically adapt to changes in those contexts
[106]. [6][80] defined a context-aware system as one that has the ability to adapt
itself to the current environment or context. So, the system is context-aware if it
senses and reacts to changes in its environment. The author who first introduced
and defined context-aware computing was [93] in 1994, who defined it as the capa-
bility of computing devices to interact with their environment in a dynamic manner.
Also [67][75][16] have offered definitions for a context-aware system, generally saying
that it reflects the ability of a system to sense or detect context information and to
process it, and then to react or respond in order to provide the most appropriate
service or information to the user.
In this regard, context-aware applications have been defined by [18] as applica-
tions that dynamically deliver services or information, and that react based on any
user context provided by sensors.
Context-awareness provides both application developers with new opportunities
for collecting context data and then adapting the behaviour of the system accord-
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ingly. With the use of mobile devices, context-awareness has become critical to
enhancing usability [19]. Although context-awareness has been the subject of much
consideration in research and development, there are as yet no specific approaches for
the implementation of context-aware systems; this is largely because such systems
depend on constraints and situations such as the positions of sensors, the number of
probable users, the accessible resources, the typical devices used or the possibility
of extending the system [17] [92].
The most appropriated definition for our work in this thesis is defined by [24]
who states that a context-aware system is one that has the ability to utilize context
in order to deliver suitable services or information to the requester, where the pro-
vided service is based both on the user’s task and his/her context.
Overall, context-aware systems are designed with the ability to automatically
adapt to current context, taking into account the environmental context, without the
need for any direct intervention by the user, and thereby to enhance the effectiveness
of the device being used [69].
From our previous definitions of context-aware systems, there are two different
types of context-aware systems as follows [48]:
• Active context-awareness: a system can sense the context and automatically
adapts to new situation based on this context.
• Passive context-awareness: a system can sense the context and presents this
context to interested user or makes the context persistent for the user to re-
trieve later, but cannot adapt to new situation based on this context.
Therefore, in our model we have used an active context-awareness because CA-
UCON model can sense the context and adapt to the new situation depend on the
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current context. Active context-awareness may help to eliminate user intervention
and adapts automatically.
2.9.3.1 Context Information Acquisition
There are various approaches to acquiring context information, as presented by [57]:
1. Direct sensor access: this is where client software on the device is able to
directly gather the desired information using internally built-in sensors.
2. Middleware infrastructure: one important method that modern software
design uses is encapsulation; it allows the separation of the graphical user in-
terface from the business logic. Encapsulation as a middleware-based approach
that provides a layered architecture model for the context-aware system with
the aim of hiding the details of any low-level sensing.
3. Context server: in this, the sensors send all the data they gather to the
context server for the purpose of facilitating multiple concurrent access. It
is logical to allow multiple clients to have access to a remote data source in
context-aware systems. The middleware-based architecture is extended by the
distributed approach through processing access by managing many distant
components.
2.9.3.2 Context-Aware System Abstract Architecture
In this section we discuss conceptual architecture layers for context-aware systems;
as illustrated in Figure 2.4 below, expansion layers are designed to detect and for
utilizing context information by attaching ’reasoning’ and ’interpreting’ functionality
[57].
The initial layer in the figure above consists of gathering data from the various
sensors. It should be noted that ’sensor’ here refers not only to sensing the hardware
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Figure 2.4: Layered conceptual framework for context-aware system [57]
but also all the data sources that are able to offer useful and utilizable context
information. In respect of the data capturing methods, sensors may be classified
into three groups:
• Physical sensors: this is the most commonly and widely used form. There
are many varieties of hardware-based sensors that are capable of capturing all
types of physical data.
• Virtual sensors: these sensors source their context data and information
from services and software applications. For instance, determining a particular
employee’s present location can be achieved by using physical sensors in the
form of tracking systems, and also using the virtual sensors in the form of
assessing employee browsing information, travel bookings, electronic calendars,
emails, etc.
• Logical sensors: these sensors utilize of combination of physical and virtual
sensors as well as additional information from various sources to resolve higher
tasks.
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The second layer of this conceptual framework is charged with the recovery of
raw context data. Suitable drives are used for physical sensors, while application
programming interfaces (APIs) are used for both logical and virtual sensors.
The pre-processing layer is the third one in the framework but is not applied in
all context-aware systems. However, it can provide helpful information that can be
used in the system if the raw data are too coarse-grained. The pre-processing layer
is tasked with performing the reasoning and interpreting of contextual information.
The fourth layer, storage and management, is responsible for organizing the
data gathered and subsequently making them available to clients through a public
interface. Clients can access information in two ways: the first is access through
a synchronous manner, whereby clients poll the new changes on the server using a
remote method. The second is asynchronous, whereby clients subscribe for a par-
ticular content or event in which they are interested.
The fifth layer in framework is application. The implementation of the real re-
sponse to various context information and events is achieved here. In some circum-
stances, application-specific context, reasoning and information retrieval manage-
ment are encapsulated and hidden from agents, which act between the pre-processing
and the application layers as an additional layer in order to communicate with the
context server.
2.10 Adaptive Systems
From the literature, there are a variety of definitions for adaptive system; one of the
most common definitions was given by [82], which states, "Self-adaptive software
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evaluates its own behaviour and changes behaviour when the evaluation indicates
that it is not accomplishing what the software is intended to do, or when better func-
tionality or performance is possible". The appropriate definition for our research was
given by [36],which states, "Self-adaptive software modifies its own behaviour in re-
sponse to changes in its operating environment. By operating environment, we mean
anything observable by the software system, such as end-user input, external hard-
ware devices and sensors, or program instrumentation" . The abstract architecture
of adaptive systems can be seen in Figure 2.5 .
Figure 2.5: Adaptive System Architecture [82]
There are different kinds of systems that have link and similar meanings to the
term adaptive system, including as self-managing and autonomic system. However,
it is challenging to identify any real differences among these terms, and they are
used interchangeably by the majority of researchers. Nevertheless, the distinction
between autonomic and self-adaptive is that the former is more general, whereas the
latter is more restricted, which means that an adaptive system is a special case of
an autonomic system.
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2.11 Adaptation in Ubiquitous Computing
Ubiquitous computing adaptation is considered as a reactive process, in which the
adaptation takes place based on a particular circumstance or series of events in
the environmental context; the main objective of this adaptation is to improve the
quality of the service being used by the system user. Therefore, the most significant
requirements for an application being applied in the ubiquitous environment are that
it has the ability to sense the surrounding environment and process these changes,
and that it can respond to these changes in an efficient and effective manner [43].
The most common description for adaptation within ubiquitous computing is
taken from the MAPE-K loop developed by IBM [25], which is often used in the
autonomic computing context. Thus, adaptation in ubiquitous computing is con-
sidered as a closed loop consisting of different phases, as shown in Figure 2.6.
The first phase is the sensing and processing of context; this phase senses the
different user contexts, such as location, user preferences, etc., and the different
system contexts, such as light level, temperature, etc. All the gathered data are
interpreted in terms of high-level context events in order to consider the various
adaptation process steps available.
The next phase is reasoning and planning; the function of this phase is to process
and analyse any new changes to the context that have been captured by the sensors,
to consider the particular type of adaptation required as well as how to accomplish
the required objectives.
The final phase in ubiquitous adaptation is adaptation acting; the responsibility
of this phase is to implement the most suitable adaptation approach in order to effect
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Figure 2.6: Adaptation loop in ubiquitous computing [25]
the adaptation decision of the previous phase (reasoning and planning process).
2.12 Adaptation Approaches
From the literature, various adaptation approaches have been utilized in order to re-
alize dynamic adaptation in software. In the following subsections, we present three
adaptation approaches, known as parameter adaptation, compositional adaptation
and action-based adaptation [63][20].
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2.12.1 Parameter Adaptation
This kind of adaptation approach is utilized to affect the behaviour of the system
via the amendment of particular variables in the program. A common instance of
this approach is TCP protocol, in which its behaviour can be adjusted in respect of
network congestion. Parameter adaptation is used in the area of ubiquitous com-
puting for amending the non-functional properties of a system that are influenced
as a consequence of context change. For instance, a portable device that has an
image render might present images in low quality because of the low bandwidth or
low memory size, and so the system adapts its behaviour to the current situation by
adjusting particular parameters in the image application in order to meet the new
situation [30].
However, having unpredictable context changes in a highly dynamic environment
raises the difficulty of trying to define in advance all the probable contexts (as well
as their processes) for non-functional properties. The advantage of the parameter
adaptation approach is that it is cheap in terms of implementation effort and com-
plexity, and this is why some context-aware systems use this approach [4].
On the other hand, the parameter adaptation approach has not been considered
as an optimal solution in the area of ubiquitous systems; the key disadvantage of this
approach is that the software components (as well as unimplemented algorithms)
that are left throughout the design stage cannot be adapted. In addition, using
this approach for such an application, where its behaviour is based on frequent
context changes, might lead to several configurable parameters becoming conflicted.
Thus, a different approach is required, i.e. one that helps to decrease the number of
parameters; like memory parameter. [7].
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2.12.2 Compositional Adaptation
Another approach to adaptation is a compositional adaptation; this goes further
than straightforward code-tuning and permits the algorithm or parts of the system
structure to be replaced to enhance the program in order to meet the current situa-
tion. Compositional adaptation works in environments with unpredictable contexts
or requirements and where new adaptation functionality may be required. Thus,
in the following two bullets, we discuss the most important technologies that have
been used in compositional adaptation [63][11]:
• Separation of Concerns: in this technology, the segregation of functional be-
haviour from non-functional behaviour in terms of development is permit-
ted, where the functional behaviour is related to business logic and the non-
functional behaviour is associated with security and quality of service. This
mechanism facilitates the development of the system and its maintenance when
upgrading the system. Separation of concerns, such as domain-specific lan-
guages, constraint languages and generic languages, has been considered a
significant principle in the area of software engineering, and it is employed in
various advanced techniques .
• Computational Reflection: this is related to the ability of an application to
process new contexts and adapt its behaviour to the current situation. It facil-
itates a system in changing its behaviour through expressing the implementa-
tion details of the system at an abstract level, devoid of negotiating portability.
In this technology, two activities are introduced: introspection and interces-
sion; the former deals with the observation of the system behaviour, and the
latter responds to the changes that are captured in the observation stage and
then adapts to the new situation.
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2.12.3 Action-Based Adaptation
This kind of adaptation approach is also known as rule-based adaptation. Action-
based adaptation is a common approach employed in adaptive systems. It is able to
define the self-configuring and self-managing aspects of the system’s behaviour that
is associated with distributive technologies and networks. This approach relies on
the concepts of state and action, where the system at a specific time (t) should move
from the current state (S1) to the next state (S2) if all corresponding conditions are
true and the transition of the system has to be determined by the action (a). There-
fore, the way to direct the system to adapt to the new situation is through using
the format of If (conditions), and Then (actions)[35] [70].
Many researchers have used this type of adaptation approach in their work. One
common model was proposed by [27], who developed an adaptation platform for
mobile systems; it uses action policies based on an event calculus, which are formu-
lated in the form of conditions and actions that accurately determine the adaptation
behaviour of the system. The conditions are defined as logical expressions that may
take the value "true" or "false", while the actions are defined as the adaptation
methods that are performed if the condition is evaluated to be "false".
Moreover, the notion of event-action rules has been used in terms of expressing
dynamic system reconfiguration. For instance, the DART project [46] uses an adap-
tation manger that implements adaptation policies, which are activated by particu-
lar events, and these events are created depending on user requirements and system
statistics. Thus, each policy is associated with one or more events, and whenever
a specific event occurs, the most suitable policies are invoked by the manager, who
then executes them. The problem is that many policies might index the same event,
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and this could cause the policies to conflict; in order to solve this problem, appro-
priate priorities are allocated to each policy.
2.13 Comparison of Adaptation Approaches
In this section, we present the differences between all the adaptation approaches
mentioned above in order to identify the one best suited to the field of ubiquitous
computing. The parameter adaptation approach is suitable for a low-dynamic en-
vironment; it can change the system’s behaviour by alerting particular parameters
that are influenced by context changes. However, this adaptation approach is not
appropriate approach for highly dynamic environments, which must consider all the
various types of context that could occur and respond based on those contextual
changes. The second adaptation approach is compositional; this is considered to
be a general approach to self-adaptation based on the language of implementation.
Depending on several works that have been accomplished through compositional
adaptation, it can be claimed that compositional adaptation is a powerful approach
for two different reasons; the first, in terms of processing level, is its flexibility of
reasoning, and the second, in terms of adaptation reaction, is the easy implementa-
tion of the dynamic reconfiguration of the system (compositional adaptation allows
algorithmic and structural changes) [63].
However, the action-based adaptation approach is considered a good alternative
solution; it uses actions in order to adapt to new situations. This type of adaptation
approach is more suitable for non-functional requirements such as security and qual-
ity of service. Based on our adaptation objective, we would prefer to use this type of
adaptation approach, as the CA-UCON model uses adaptation actions in adapting
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to the current context. The action-based adaptation approach uses conditions and
actions, where the actions take place if the conditions are evaluated as being false
in the adaptation process.
2.14 Related Work on Context-Aware Access Con-
trol Models
In this section, we present some additional works that have been done in the area of
context-aware access control models, which merge the context information with cre-
dentials while making any decision over access control. In other words, the context-
aware access control model is an access control mechanism that uses context infor-
mation as a further constraint to govern and control the resources or adapts to the
new situation [34].
2.14.1 Extensions of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)Model
In this subsection we present some proposed models that extend the RBAC model
to include the context information in the access decision. We, then compare these
models with our proposed model in order to show the differences and the limitations.
Figure 2.7: CAAC conceptual view [26]
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As can be seen in Figure 2.7, the new kind of restriction introduced to the
context-aware access control model is known as a contextual constraint, which con-
trols the user assignment and permission assignment functions [26]. For example, a
specific role is granted to a specified user only if the contextual constraints of that
user are fulfilled, and permission is assigned to that role only if the contextual con-
straints of the holder of this role are fulfilled. A further discussion of such models
is given in the following subsections.
2.14.1.1 Generalised Role-Based Access Control Model
This is one of the earliest models and was proposed by [29] in the area of context-
aware access control. This model was proposed for the smart home environment,
which extends the notion of the role to include two kinds of roles, which are known
as object role and environment role. The environment role is utilized to capture the
environment context, which means the system context as well, as it is considered in
the decision-making process. However, the object role is used to capture the level
of sensitivity of the requested object. For instance, if a subject wants to perform
a particular right over a particular object, the access control considers the object
role, subject role, environment role and the right in order to permit the access. The
purpose of these widened roles is to eliminate the restriction of the subject-centric
roles of the RBAC model. Because of the introduction of these extended roles, the
GRBAC model becomes more complex in term of decision-making, which means
that it requires a complex framework as well [45][47].
2.14.1.2 Spatio-Temporal Models
Several access control models were developed in the area of pervasive systems, and
in order to control the access, they generally use two types of context information:
time and location [99] [101]. One of these models is known as Temporal Role-Based
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Access Control (TRBAC) model proposed by [10], which is an extension of the RBAC
model. This model introduced a new notion called temporal restriction within access
control policy, which offers a new mechanism that implements the access control
policies based on time. Therefore, the assignment of any role to the user relies on
satisfying the temporal constraint. Another model is known as generalized Temporal
Role-Based Access Control (GTRBAC) model [41], which extends the above model
(TRBAC) by including the idea of an activating role. The difference between an
activating role and an enabling role is that an enabling role can be claimed by the
user with all the related permissions. However, an activating role is an enabling
role that must be activated in the particular session by at least one user. So, the
user can obtain all the related permissions of the current role. The advantage of
the activating role is that it assists in identifying the currently running role, which
is utilized to observe all running activities and usage of resources. Many temporal
restrictions are enforced by the GTRBAC model on user assignment and permission
assignment policy, enabling time and role activation [22].
A different model was proposed by [109], which is known as Spatial Role-Based
Access Control (SRBAC) Model. This model considers a constraint that is based
on location. In this, the access permission is granted to the user based on the user’s
location; the location may be divided into several zones and each one may be assigned
to a different set of permissions. Thus, if the user requests access, the condition of
this role must be fulfilled in the current zone. From the table 2.1, it can be seen
that each user role is assigned with a different permission in a specific location. The
main problem of this model is that it does not have the proper semantic meaning
of the position information.
Various models have been categorized as spatio-temporal access control methods,
which consider location and time in terms of contextual information in the access
decision process, including those explained in [100] [49].
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Table 2.1: Location Permission Assignment List in SRBAC
Roles Location Permissions
Customer_role Zone1 P1,P2,P3
Customer_role Zone2 P4
Customer_role Zone3 φ
2.14.1.3 Dynamic Role-Based Access Control Model
The models examined above have a common aspect in that they consider the context
information of the user at the time of the request. Thus, the user’s context infor-
mation is evaluated, which means that if the user requests to access an object, the
system evaluates the context information of the user in order to determine whether
or not to allow access to the requested object. The evaluation of the context infor-
mation is performed at the time of the request, and there is no further evaluation
once the right has been granted to the user. Moreover, only time and location as
context information are considered in spatio-temporal models, even though context
information is represented by more than just time and location. Therefore, in the
pervasive environment, all types of context information should be considered in order
to build a comprehensive access control model.
To solve this problem, a model was proposed by [108], which is known as the
Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (DRBAC) model. In this model, the role and
permission assignments are regulated dynamically, relying on the context informa-
tion of the user, but it considers all types of context information by using the Central
Authority (CA) in order to deal with and manage the role hierarchy for the user
in granting those roles. In the CA, an agent is utilized in the device of the user in
order to observe and alter the role(s), based on the context information. The agent
is represented by a state machine, which means that each state represents a role,
and the transition between the current role to another role is performed by moving
from the current state to another state; this happens based only on the context
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information.
The key disadvantage of the DRBAC model is that it is highly complex in terms
of implementation, as the user device must have a role state machine running for
each role. This increases the number of roles in the system, which increases the
complexity of the system; this is a major problem for the restricted devices that are
generally used in pervasive environments.
Various models have been categorized as Dynamic access control methods in-
cluding those explained in [15][115]
2.14.1.4 CAAC-based Models with Architectural Components
Context-aware access control models require a special architecture to gather and
manage the context information that must be considered in the decision-making
process. This architecture must contain two parts: one for the collection and man-
agement of the context information, and the second one for controlling the access.
However, the architecture that represents the traditional access control models in-
cludes only one part, which is access control, and so is not suitable for models in
which context information is considered in decision-making. In order to conquer
this restriction, a variety of architectures have been proposed recently to capture
the context information. In the following paragraph, we present one example of
these architectures [44].
UbiCOSM: One of the context-aware access control models is known as Ubi-
COSM [23]. It uses the evaluation of the user’s context in order to control the
objects or resources. As can be seen from the figure 2.8, the UbiCOSM model in-
cludes the external model that manages the context and that deals with low-level
entity identification (like CARMEN [9]). It is hard for UbiCOSM to hold diverse
access control requirements, application domains and policies because of the strong
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connection between context information and access permissions.
Figure 2.8: UbiCOSM middleware services [23]
The reason behind introducing the authorisation enforcement manager in Ubi-
COSM is to segregate the authorisation engine from the access control enforcement.
This separation offers a high degree of modularity, while the enforcement of an access
control is based on application.
However, The majority of these works and their solutions have been constructed
on the RBAC model. All the above RBAC extensions are simply represented in CA-
UCON model, where CA-UCON has the preAdapting components that can adapt
to the new situation before the access request is granted (based on the context
information). In addation, CA-UCON goes beyond that by controlling the usage
and adapt to the change in the environment in order to preserve continuity of usage.
So, each extension of traditional access control above is considered as a special case
of CA-UCON model.
2.14.2 Extensions of Usage Control (UCON) Model
Many recent works have been done to improve the UCON model and solve this
weakness in pervasive computing system. For instance, [113] proposed a new access
control called as Times-based Usage Control (TUCON) in order to protect digital
resources misuse. In TUCON the use of the time variable is Initiated into UCON,
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and greatest times described as consumption restrictions. This approach is simply
identified in CA-UCON model by specified the time as condition requirement. [39]
proposed a new model defined as Geography Usage Control (GEO-UCON) model
to deal with GEO DBMS access control. In this model, a geospatial factor is in-
troduced into UCON in order to ensure data protection in mobile applications and
location-based services. This model like the last one, it can be defined in CA-UCON
model where the location can be used as condition requirement to control the ser-
vice.
Moreover, [5] proposed usage control model to context-aware in mobile com-
puting environments defined as ConUCON. In this model two new components are
introduced: context and states. The access decisions in ConUCON model is based
on these new components plus obligations. [58] proposed a new model called as
contextual Usage Control (CUC) model which replaces the conditions component
in UCON by context and add a management module to it. The last two models are
using context information as further constraints in order to govern and control the
resources by changing the condition component into context, which is basically the
UCON model can do that. UCON model has condition component which can sense
the context of environment, but it cannot adapt to the new situation based on this
context. However, all these efforts have not completely solve this issue.
In contrary the above UCON extensions, CA-UCON model enables adaptation
to environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access by triggering
specific actions to adapt to new situations. In addition to data protection, CA-
UCON model enhances the quality of services, striving to keep explicit interactions
with the user at a minimum. This makes it more suitable for pervasive computing
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systems.
2.15 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a background about traditional access control mod-
els (MAC, DAC,RBAC), trust management(TM) and DRM by discussing the pur-
poses, functionality and distinction between these models. We then, investigated
usage control model (UCON) which is considered as a new access control model and
determines what distinguishes it from other traditional access control models.
In next part of this chapter, we gave an overview of ubiquitous systems and
context-aware systems by examining the context and context-aware system and
properties of Ubicom systems. In addition, the definition of adaptive systems and
the adaptation in ubiquitous system are presented. Then, a various aspects of
adaptation in term of adaptation approaches are covered. Finally, previous works
on context-aware access control are provided.
In the following chapter, we propose a context-aware and adaptive usage control
model by demonstrating architecture and computational model of this model.
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Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage
Control (CA-UCON) Model
Objectives:
• Present a novel architecture of the CA-UCON Model.
• Present a computational Model of CA-UCON .
• Give formal definition of CA-UCON model .
• Show the Expressive power of the CA-UCON model.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose a Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage CONtrol (CA-
UCON) model which extends the traditional UCON model to enable adaptation to
environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access. Indeed, when
the authorisations and obligations requirements are met by the subject and the
object, and the conditions requirements fail due to changes in the environment or
the system context, CA-UCON model triggers specific actions to adapt to the new
situation. Besides the data protection, CA-UCON model so enhances the quality
of services, striving to keep explicit interactions with the user at a minimum. We,
then propose a novel architecture for Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control
(CA-UCON) model which is introduced based on the notion of context-aware sys-
tem. The main innovative features of this architecture is the merging of continuity
of usage decision (UD) and dynamic adaptation decision (AD) to changes in the en-
vironmental or system context. The computational model of CA-UCON is described
as a Finite State Machine (FSM), depicting how a subject’s request to access an ob-
ject is handled in this model. Moreover, we provide the formal definition of the two
newly introduced adaptation models within the CA-UCON model. The expressive
power of CA-UCON model is presented which the UCON model can be specified in
CA-UCON model; and so all the access control models that can be represented in
UCON (such as RBAC, MAC, DAC, DRM).
3.2 Architecture of CA-UCON model
In this section, we elucidate the whole architecture of the CA-UCON model as de-
picted in Figuer 3.1, it provides comprehensive definition of each components in the
architecture and reveals the functions performed by each components in the archi-
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tecture, in particular how these components interrelate with each other to complete
the task of permit or deny the access request. The architecture highlights the two
important components known as usage decision (UD) component and the adap-
tation decision (AD) component. The two dashed ovals materialise the fact that
usage decision and adaptation decision happen continuously before and during us-
age. The following subsections explain the intuitive meanings of the two significant
components with all corresponding components.
Figure 3.1: Architecture of The CA-UCON model
3.2.1 Usage Decision (UD)
This component is described as in the usage control model (UCON), making de-
cision of granting or denying rights of access based on three factors identified as
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authorisation, obligation and condition components [73]:
• Authorisations (A): Authorisations are a key functional requirement that
must be fulfilled before granting a particular right of access to a digital object.
Authorization predicates place conditions and constraints in the form of logical
predicates on both the subject and object attributes. The authorization pred-
icates are activated and evaluated both before (pre-authorization) and during
(on-authorization) access.
• oBligations (B): Obligations are also functional predicates which are used to
confirm mandatory requirements that a subject must undertake both before
and during a particular usage process. The mandatory requirements here
may be either pre-obligations (preB) to be fulfilled before access permission is
granted or on-obligations (onB) to be fulfilled during access.
• Conditions (C): Conditions are environmental constraints that must be con-
sidered in the process of usage decisions. Conditions are not related directly
to objects or subjects, but they are based on environmental attributes. The
evaluation of condition predicates may take place before granting permission
to access a digital object (pre-conditions) or while the subject is using the
object (on-conditions). When conditions fail due to changes in the environ-
mental context, adaptation actions are triggered in an attempt to change the
environmental context such that these conditions hold.
3.2.2 Adaptation Decision (AD)
This component decides what adaptation action to perform depending on the envi-
ronmental context which is refined into subject context, object context, information
and communication technology (ICT) context, and the physical environment con-
text:
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• Subject Context:
Subject context is any type of context information linked to the subject such
as his location, activity, preferences, and people nearby.
• Object Context:
Object context refers to any kinds of context information related to the object.
These can be the location of the object, execution state, nearby resources and
availability.
• Physical environments context:
This characterises relevant physical phenomena taking place such as the time,
light, noise level, temperature, weather and so on.
• ICT context:
ICT context is general term that deals with any kind of context information
related to ICT and computing system included any communication devices
or applications nearby. Examples of these contexts include: laptops battery
rate, network reliability, smart phones memory size, PDAs and hardware ca-
pability and communication bandwidth. In addition, the diverse services and
applications related to them, such as video-conferencing and distance learning.
• Adaptation Actions:
Adaptation action is an operation that should be performed over condition
predicate with the purpose of overcoming the environments changes. These
actions may be classified according to the subject of the adaptation and the
scope. For example, service instance adaptation actions (retry, duplicate ser-
vice, and substitute service) and flow instance adaptation actions (redo, choose
alternative service, and undo).
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3.2.3 Subjects (S) and subject Attributes (ATT(S))
A subject is an entity who requests access to a resource and must hold certain rights
of access to the target object or resource. Subject has attributes which are used in
the usage decision making. For example of subject attributes are : identities, roles,
group name and memberships. We let S denote the set of subjects and ATT(S)
denote the set of subject attributes.
3.2.4 Object (O) and Object Attributes (ATT (O))
Object is the resource or entity which the subject has to hold a certain right to access
or use. Object attributes are the descriptions and properties of a given object which
could be used as the basis for the provision and making of the usage decision process.
For instance of object attributes are: ownership, security labels and role permission.
Let O denote the set of objects and ATT(O), the set of object attributes.
3.2.5 Rights (R)
Rights are privileges that subject can hold and use on an object. The subject must
fulfill the authorizations, obligations and conditions requirements in order to be
granted the right to access the object. For example of rights are: read, write and
download The subject loses this right anytime one of these requirements does not
hold. If this happen during access, there are two possibilities: (i) if either authorisa-
tions requirement or obligations requirement is not fulfilled, then the access right is
revoked and the access stopped at once; (ii) if both authorisations requirement and
obligations requirement are fulfilled, but the conditions requirement is not met due
to changes in the environmental context, the system will attempt to adapt to the
new situation by performing specific adaptation actions (including request to alter-
native object); if the adaptation is successful then the access continues, otherwise
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the access right is revoked and the access terminated.
3.3 Computational model of the CA-UCON model
In this section, a computational model of CA-UCON model is presented , it can be
described as a Finite State Machine (FSM) depicting how an subject’s request to
access an object is handled in the CA-UCON model. The FSM is depicted by the
graph in Figuer 3.2, where nodes are called states and edges are called transitions.
The initial state, labelled initial, corresponds to the state when the system is wait-
ing for a subject to submit a request. There are three final states: end, when the
access has successfully terminated; denied, when the access request has been denied;
and revoked, when access permission has been revoked during access and hence the
access stopped.
The intuitive meaning of the remaining states of the FSM can be summarised as
follows: requesting, denotes when the access request is being processed; accessing,
represents the state when the actual access is taking place; preadapting, is the state
when the system is trying to adapt to the environmental context prior to access;
and finally onadapting, is when the system is trying to adapt to the environmental
context during access.
The transitions of the FSM are labelled with the events (or actions) that fire them.
The event tryaccess occurs when a subject sends an access request (e.g. by clicking
a menu button). This event forces the FSM to enter the requesting state to pro-
cess that access request. While in this state, the system can perform updates on
subject’s and object’s attributes through preupdate events. If the authorisations,
obligations and conditions requirements are all met, the system emits the permi-
taccess event and moves into the accessing state. If for some reasons either the
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Figure 3.2: Execution of an access request in the CA-UCON model
authorisations requirement or the obligations requirement is not met, the system
emits the event denyaccess and terminates in the denied state. However, if both the
authorisations requirement and obligations requirement are met, but the conditions
requirement is not satisfied, the system emits the preadaptaccess event and moves
into the preadapting state.
In this state, specific adaptation actions, denoted by the preadapt events, are per-
formed in an attempt to meet the conditions requirement. If the adaptation is
successful, the permitaccess event is raised and the system transitions into the ac-
cessing state. In addition, a new request to access a specified alternative object,
denoted by the tryaltaccess event, may be issued automatically by the system if
the adaptation actions fail. Otherwise the access request is simply denied when no
adaptation is possible.
When access permission is granted (see permitaccess event), the system transitions
into the accessing state in which the actual access takes place. During access the sys-
tem can perform updates on subject’s and object’s attributes via onupdate events.
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If during access either the authorisations requirement or the obligations requirement
is not met, the system emits the event revokeaccess and terminates in the revoked
state. However, if both the authorisations requirement and obligations requirement
are continuously met, but the conditions requirement fails, the system raises the
on-adaptaccess event and moves into the onadapting state.
In this state, specific adaptation actions, denoted by the on-adapt events, are per-
formed in an attempt to meet the conditions requirement. If the adaptation is
successful, the continueaccess event is raised and the system moves back into the
accessing state. In the effort to enhance the quality of service even further, the sys-
tem might issue an implicit request to access a specified alternative object through
the tryaltaccess event, when the adaptation actions fail. In the worst case when
no adaptation is possible, the access permission is simply revoked and the access
stopped at once. When an access terminates successully via the endaccess event,
the system moves into the end state and eventually performs updates on subject’s
and object’s attributes through postupdate events.
Therefore, The Finite State Machine (FSM) of CA-UCON model in figure 3.2 will be
specified using Calculus of Context-Aware Ambient(CCA) and later used to analyse
the behaviour of the model.
3.4 The CA-UCONABD Family Core Models
In this section, a formal definition of CA-UCON model is presented which extends
and enhances the traditional UCON model by enabling the adaptation features on
it. [73] defined the UCONABC family core models where A stands for Authorisations,
B for oBligations and C for Conditions. Here we define the CA-UCONABD family
core models where C is replaced by D for aDaptation. So the CA-UCONA and
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CA-UCONB family core models are identical to UCONA and UCONB, respectively.
The CA-UCOND family core model comprises two new models: the pre-adaptation
model CA-UCONpreD and the ongoing adaptation model CA-UCONonD. The CA-
UCONABD family core models are detailed below.
3.4.1 The CA-UCONpreA Model
The CA-UCONpreA Model has exactly the same meaning as on UCON Model which
evaluates the attributes of subject and object for the decision making before the
subject access the object (at the time of access request). So, if the pre-authorization
evaluate to true the access request is granted to the subject.
The CA-UCONpreA core model is composed of:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes.
The subject who request an access to an object.
• O : set of Objects, ATT(O): set of object attributes.
The object is an service or resource that the subject request access on it.
• R: set of rights.
The right are privileges that an subject has to hold in order to access an object.
• PreA: pre-authorizations.
• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ preA((ATT (s), ATT (o), r).
This predicate denotes that the subject s is allowed to access the object o with
the right r, if the predicate preA is evaluated to true.
3.4.2 The CA-UCONOnA Model
The CA-UCONOnA model is also has the same concept like in UCON model which
evaluates the attributes to control the usage access during the access time. In
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absence of pre-authorization, the requested access is always allowed. However, on-
going authorization is active throughout the usage of the requested right. The
CA-UCONOnA core model is composed of:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes.
• O : set of Objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes.
• R: set of rights.
• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ true;
This predicate denotes that there are no pre-authorizations required at the
time of access request.
• OnA: ongoing-authorizations.
• Stopped(s, o, r)⇐ ¬onA(ATT (s), ATT (o), r)
This predicate denotes that the right r used by the subject s on the object o
is revoked, if the predicate onA is evaluated to false.
3.4.3 The CA-UCONpreB Model
The CA-UCONpreB Model has defined precisely as the same as in UCON model
which is a kind of history function that checks whether certain obligations have
been fulfilled or not and return true or false before the access is granted. The preB
predicate is evaluated to true, if all the required pre-obligation elements preOBL are
fulfilled using preFulfilled predicate. The CA-UCONpreB core model is composed of:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes.
• O : set of Objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes.
• R: set of rights.
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• OBS : set of obligation subject, OBO : set of obligation object, OB : set of
obligation actions.
There are three different types of obligations : obligation that are related to
the subject which have to be fulfilled by the subject before the access right is
granted, obligations that are related to object which must to be satisfied at
the time of access of request; obligations that are linked to actions.
• preB : pre-obligation predicates.
• preOBL: pre-obligation elements
This predicate is responsible for holding all obligations types.
• preOBL ⊆ OBS ×OBO ×OB.
• prefulfilled : OBS ×OBO ×OB → {true, false}.
This predicate is checking all types of obilgations and return with ture or false.
• getPreOBL : S ×O ×R→ 2preOBL.
This is a function to select pre-obligations for a requested usage.
• PreB(s, o, r) =

∧
(obsi,oboi,obi)∈getpreOBL(s,o,r) prefulfilled(obsi, oboi, obi)
if getPreOBL(s, o, r) 6= ∅;
True if getPreOBL(s, o, r) = ∅;

This function denotes that the predicate preB is true, if the prefulfilled predicate
returns true or there are no required obligations for current access request.
• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ preB(s, o, r);
This function denotes that the subject s is granted the right r to access the object
o, if the predicate preB is true.
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3.4.4 The CA-UCONonB Model
The CA-UCONonB Model as the same as in UCON model which is a kind of history
function that checks whether certain obligations have been fulfilled or not and return
true or false during the access. The onB predicate is evaluated to true, if all the
required on-obligation elements onOBL are fulfilled using onFulfilled predicate. The
CA-UCONonB core model is composed of:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes.
• O : set of Objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes.
• R: set of rights.
• OBS : set of obligation subject, OBO : set of obligation object, OB : set of
obligation action.
• T : set of time or event elements,onOBL: ongoing-obligation elements
• onB : ongoing-obligations predicates.
• onOBL ⊆ OBS ×OBO ×OB × T.
• getOnOBL : S × O × R → 2onOBL , a function to select ongoing-obligations
for a requested usage.
• onFulfilled : OBS ×OBO ×OB × T → {true, false};
• onB(s, o, r) = ∧(obsi,oboi,obi,ti)∈getOnOBL(s,o,r)onFulfilled(obsi, oboi, obi, ti);
• onB(s, o, r) = true by definition if getOnOBL(s, o, r) = ∅
This predicate denotes that the predicate onB is true, if there are no required
obligations during the access.
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• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ true;
This predicate denotes that there are no pre-obligations required at the time
of access request.
• stopped(s, o, r)⇐ ¬onB(s, o, r).
This predicate denotes that the right r used by the subject s on the object o
is revoked, if the the predicate onB is evaluated to false.
3.4.5 The CA-UCONpreD Model
In the CA-UCONpreD model, adaptation can be activated only before the access
permission is granted. That is adaptation cannot take place during access. If s is
subject, o is object and r an access right, we let preD(s, o, r) denote a predicate
which is true if the pre-adaptation is successful and false otherwise. We also denote
the access permission decision by the predicate allowed(s , o, r). The CA-UCONpreD
core model is composed of the following elements:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes.
• O : set of objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes.
• AD : set of adaptation actions.
• PreCON : set of pre-conditions elements.
• T : time domain.
• PreAdapted : 2preCON×AD × T −→ {true, false}
preAdapted(c, a, t) is a boolean function that performs the adaptation action a
until all the conditions in c evaluate to true, in which case the function returns
true; otherwise the function returns false after t time-units have elapsed since
the execution of the action a started.
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• getPreADAPT : S ×O ×R −→ 2preCON × AD × T
getPreADAPT(s, o, r) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where c is the set of all pre-
conditions required to grant the subject s the access right r upon the object
o, a is the adaptation action to be performed if any of the pre-conditions does
not hold, and t is the time-out for this adaptation process.
• getPreAltReq : S ×O ×R −→ 2O×R
getPreAltReq(s, o, r) denotes the set of alternative requests that can be made
on behalf of the subject s when the initial request of the access right r upon
the object o could not be granted due to environmental conditions.
• preD(s, o, r) = preAdapted(getPreADAPT(s, o, r ))
• The access permission decision is defined as:
• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ preD(s, o, r);
This predicate denotes that the subject s is granted the right r to access the
object o, if the adaptation process for this access request is successful.
ended(s , o, r)⇒

¬preD(s, o, r)
∧∨
(o′,r′)∈E
allowed(s , o ′, r ′)

This predicate denotes that the right r requested by the subject s to access
the object o is ended, if the predicate preD is false and an alternative request
is issued.
where E = getPreAltReq(s , o, r) and the symbol ‘⇒’ denotes the logical im-
plication.
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3.4.6 The CA-UCONonD Model
In the CA-UCONonD model, there is no pre-adaptation; adaptation can only take
place during access. If s is subject, o is object and r an access right, we let
onD(s, o, r) denote a predicate which is true if the ongoing adaptation is successful
and false otherwise. We also denote by stopped(s , o, r) a predicate which is true
if the access has been stopped. The CA-UCONonD core model is composed of the
following elements:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes, O : set of objects, ATT
(O): set of object attributes
• AD : set of adaption strategies (or actions)
• onCON : set of ongoing-conditions elements
• T : time domain
• onAdapted : 2onCON × AD × T → {true, false}
onAdapted(c, a, t) is a boolean function that performs action a until all the
conditions in c evaluate to true, in which case the function returns true; oth-
erwise the function returns false after t time-units have elapsed since the
execution of the action a started.
• getOnADAPT : S ×O ×R→ 2onCON × AD × T
getOnADAPT(s,o, r ) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where c is the set of all ongoing-
conditions required for the subject s to keep the right r upon the object
o during access, a is the adaptation action to be performed if any of the
ongoing-conditions does not hold, and t is the time-out for this adaptation
process.
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• getOnAltReq : S ×O ×R→ 2O×R
getOnAltReq(s, o, r) denotes the set of alternative requests that can be made
on behalf of the subject s when the initial request of the access right r upon
the object o fails during access due to environmental conditions.
• onD(s, o, r) = onAdapted(getOnADAPT(s, o, r ))
• allowed(s, o, r )⇒ true
• The predicate stopped is defined as follows:
stopped(s , o, r)⇐

¬onD(s, o, r)
∧∧
(o′,r′)∈F
stopped(s , o ′, r ′)

where F = getOnAltReq(s , o, r) and the formula V ⇐ W means that W
implies V .
3.5 Expressive Power of the CA-UCON Model
In this section we show that the UCON model can be specified in CA-UCON model
and so all the security models that can be specified in UCON, such as Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) and Digital Rights Management (DRM). As mentioned in
the previous section, the authorisation and obligation family core models of CA-
UCON are identical to those of UCON. Rest to prove that the condition family
core models of UCON can be modelled by the adaptation family core models of
CA-UCON.
Indeed, the UCONpreC model is a special case of CA-UCONpreD model where:
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• AD = {skip}, where skip is a special action that does nothing and lasts one
time-unit.
• T = {1}, the unique time-out is one time-unit.
• getPreAltReq(s, o, r) = φ, for all (s, o, r) ∈ S ×O ×R.
Similarly, the UCONonC model is a special case of CA-UCONonD model where:
• AD = {skip}, where skip is a special action that does nothing and lasts one
time-unit.
• T = {1}, the unique time-out is one time-unit.
• getOnAltReq(s, o, r) = φ, for all (s, o, r) ∈ S ×O ×R.
CA-UCON model can act as UCON model, if the condition of the access re-
quest is met where the adaptation in this case is skipped (no adaptation action is
performed).
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new model called Context-Aware and Adaptive Us-
age Control model (CA-UCON) as novel architecture which extends the traditional
UCON model to enable adaptation to environmental changes in the aim of preserv-
ing continuity of access. The major innovative aspect of this model is the integration
of continuity of usage decision and dynamic adaptation to changes in the environ-
mental or system context, so as to ensure continuity of usage. We then propose a
novel computational model of our CA-UCON architecture. This model is formally
specified as a finite state machine. It demonstrates how the access request of the
subject will be handled in CA-UCON model. The formal definition of CA-UCON
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model is presented where the extension of the original UCON architecture can be
understood from this model.
In the following chapter, the formal specification of CA-UCONmodel is presented
using the mathematical notation of CCA [96] and later used to analyse the behaviour
of the model.
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Chapter 4
Formal Specification of CA-UCON
Model in CCA
Objectives:
• Present an overview of mathematical notation of CCA
• Give ambient-based model of CA-UCON model
• Present formal specification of CA-UCON model in CCA
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we represent a formal specification of the CA-UCON model by
using the Calculus of Context-aware Ambient (CCA). This mathematical notation
is considered suitable for mobile and context-aware systems and has been preferred
over alternatives for the following reasons: (i) Mobility and Context awareness are
primitive constructs in CCA; (ii) A system’s properties can be formally analysed;
(iii) Most importantly, CCA specifications are executable allowing early validation of
system properties and accelerated development of prototypes. This is based on the
concept of an ambient that was first introduced in calculus of mobile ambient [91].
An ambient is an entity that describes a component (e.g., process, location, device,
etc.). Using CCA, the model along with all ambient and external and internal
interactions can be formalised. Below, we discuss CCA’s syntax with regards to
processes and capabilities.
4.2 Overview of CCA
To integrate and incorporate computers into general activities, pervasive computing
is the new paradigm being used. Pervasive computing allows applications in a dis-
tributed system to support mobility and context-awareness. Entities (i.e. devices
and users) can be mobile. A context-aware system must be able to process informa-
tion regarding its current context within its environment. It must then be able to
use this information to change the way it behaves and match the current conditions.
To model such situations effectively, CCA was proposed by [96]. CCA builds upon
a previous calculus known as Mobile Ambients [91] whilst introducing new ideas.
It enables ambient (e.g., software, devices, locations, etc.) and processes to have
an awareness of the conditions and context in which they are executed. The re-
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sulting process calculus is flexible and powerful, emphasising context awareness and
mobility.
4.2.1 Modelling in CCA
The Calculus of Context-aware Ambients (CCA) is a process calculus. It is based
on the idea of ambients (as defined above) and is used to model ambients in terms
of capability, process and location. In this section, the modelling of a user and
its surrounding environment is shown. From this example, it can be understood
how to model ambients in general. Before moving onto the example, let us set out
the actors. We specify an arbitrary user Bob whose behaviour is described by the
process PBob as:
Bob
PBob
An entity in CCA has a location (similar to the real world). Within CCA the
location of an ambient is modelled as a parent ambient. For instant if Bob is in
an class room, then the ClassRoom ambient will be the parent of ambient Bob and
represent his location:
ClassRoom
Bob
PBob | PClassRoom
Each ambient has a context which is defined by the ambients around them. For
example, Bob’s context is defined by the classroom, possible other users, his phone
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which he is carrying etc.
Faculty
ClassRoom1
bob
phone
Pphone
| Pbob | PClassRoom1
ClassRoom2
Alice
PAlice
| PClassRoom2 | PFaculty
So, the user Bob’s environment is represented by the variety of the existed am-
bients which are around it such as in above example, (faculty, classroom1, phone,
classroom2 and Alice), which in this situation the user Bob is one of the ambient in
this environment. The textual representation of the above graph can be shown as
follows:
faculty [ classroom1 [ bob[ phone[Pphone] | Pbob] | Pclassroom1 ]
| classroom2 [ alice[ Palice] | Pclassroom2 ]
| Pfaculty ]
4.2.2 Syntax of CCA
Within this section we present the syntax of CCA notation. In CCA, the most
basic entities are names. This is similar to pi-calculus [64][91]. Names are given
to all ambients whether they are users, devices or locations. We shall define 4
syntactic categories with CCA. These are: processes P , capabilities M , locations α
and context expressions κ. Names are always written in lower case letters e.g. n, x
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and y etc. A list of names is denoted by y˜ and |y˜| represents the size of the list.
4.2.2.1 Processes
As can be seen in Table 4.1 the process 0 concludes without actions. If two processes
P and Q are running in parallel, this will be denoted by P |Q. To limit the scope of a
name, the following notation is used: (νn) P , indicates that the scope of n is limited
to P . The sign of replication is !, so the replication process !P signifies a process that
can create a new replica of the process P whenever needed, i.e. !P ≡ P |!P . The
process n[P ] indicates an ambient n whose behaviour is described by P . Further, the
square brackets [ and ] indicate the boundaries of an ambient’s behaviour. Whatever
is within the brackets is the ambient’s behaviour.
Table 4.1: Syntax of CCA: processes
P,Q Description
0 inactivity
P |Q parallel composition
(νn) P name restriction
n[P ] an ambient
!P repetition
κ?M.P context-guarded capability
x . (y˜).P process abstraction
A context expression denotes the condition that must be matched by the envi-
ronment of the executing process. The context-guarded prefix k?M.P is a process
which delays and does not execute the capability M followed by the process P until
the condition (which is the context expression k) fulfils the surrounding environ-
ment. The context-guarded prefix is very similar to the If − Then statement in its
functionality. The (If condition Then action) statement also performs the action
if the condition(s) are satisfied. The use of context-guarded prefix is one of the two
main mechanisms for context acquisition in CCA. The second mechanisms of con-
text acquisition (which is discussed below) is the invoking of a process abstraction.
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Lastly, the process abstraction x . (y˜).P indicates the linking of the name x to
the process P , where y˜ is a set of formal parameters. The linking is restricted
to the executing ambient where in the process abstraction is defined. So a name x
can be linked to many processes in a number of distinct ambients. E.g. name x is
linked to process P in ambient n and to process Q in ambient m. An invocation to a
process abstraction named x is performed by the executing ambient by carrying out
the capability α x〈z˜〉 where α denotes the position in which the process abstraction
is specified and z˜ is the set of actual parameters.
4.2.2.2 Location
Since ambients can liaise with each other, the location is an important parameter
which is utilised as a reference by the communicating ambients. An ambient can
communicate with a parent ambient, child ambient or sibling ambient. So, in table
4.2 the location α can be ‘↑ ’ which indicates any parent, ′n ↑′ for a definite parent
ambient named n, ‘↓’ which denotes any child, and ‘n ↓’ for a definite child ambient
named n, the ′ ::′ which refers to any sibling, and ′n ::′ signifies a specific sibling
ambient named n. However, it is possible for an ambient to utilise  (empty string)
to refer to itself.
Table 4.2: Syntax of CCA: location
α Description
↑ any parent
n ↑ parent n
↓ any child
n ↓ child n
:: any sibling
n :: sibling n
 local
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4.2.2.3 Capabilities
As can be seen in Table 4.3 there are two mobility capabilities, defined in CCA [96],
which make it possible for an ambient to move in its environment. These are in and
out . An ambient can execute the capability ’in n’ to move into a sibling ambient
named n, and the capability out allows an ambient to move out of its parent ambient.
Table 4.3: Syntax of CCA: capabilities
M Description
in n move into ambient n
out move out
α x〈y˜〉 process call
α (y˜) input
α 〈y˜〉 output
del n delete ambient n
A process call α x〈y˜〉 executes like the process linked to x at location α, where
each actual parameter in y˜ replaces each occurrence of the corresponding formal
parameter. A process call can only occur if the corresponding process abstraction is
accessible at the location specified. Ambients are able to send and receive messages.
Using the capability α 〈y˜〉 an ambient is able to send a list of names y˜ to a location
α. An ambient can execute the capability α (y˜) to receive in the variables in y˜ a set
of names from a location α.
Finally, the capability del n removes an ambient named n. However, this only
occurs if that ambient is of the form n[0], i.e. an empty ambient. Necessarily
ambient n has to be located at the same level as that capability. I.e. the ambient
executing the del capability must be the parent ambient of n. For example, the
process del n.P | n[0] reduces to P . The capability del can be viewed as a garbage
collector that removes empty ambients which have no computations left to perform,
i.e. n[0].
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4.2.3 Context model
In a similar manner to Mobile Ambients MA, the ambient is the basic construction
to symbolize any entity in any system in CCA. As mentioned previously, an ambient
has a name, a boundary and can host and be nested inside other ambients. This al-
lows a set of ambients to be described hierarchically. A hole, which is denoted by ,
is a special context that symbolizes the position of the executing process in the sys-
tem. For example, assume a system is represented by the process P | n[Q |m[R | S]],
then the context of the process R in that system is P | n[Q | m[ | S]]. The context
of the ambient named m is P | n[Q | ], and that of ambient n is P | . The gram-
mar in Table 4.4 details the contexts of CCA processes. A property of a context is
called context expression (CE in short).
Table 4.4: Syntax of contexts
E Description
0 nil
 hole
n[E] location
E|P parallel composition
(νn) E restriction
In Table 4.4, P is any process, E stands for the context and n represents a name.
The context 0 represents an empty context, i.e. it does not render any information.
The hold , denotes the position of a process in that process’s context. The context
n[E] indicates that the context E is the internal context of the ambient n. The
context P |E signifies that the process P executes with the context E in parallel;
to rephrase, the context E is an element of the context of process P . The context
(νn) E denotes a name restriction, such that the scope of the name n is limited to
the context E.
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Table 4.5 presents the algebraic semantics of contexts. The first equality (cont-0)
signifies that a context with the value of 0 is a nil context; in other words it would
have no affect on other contexts in parallel execution with it. (cont-1) signifies that
parallel compositions of context are commutative, while (cont-2) indicates to them
being associative. The equality (cont-7) denotes that equality is propagated across
scope. (cont-8) states that equality is also propagated across parallel composition
and (cont-9) states that equality propagates through ambient nesting.
Table 4.5: Algebraic semantics of contexts
E | 0 = E (cont-0)
E1 | E2 = E2 | E1 (cont-1)
E1 |(E2 | E3) = (E1 | E2) | E3 (cont-2)
(νn)(νm) E = (νm)(νn) E (cont-3)
(νn) E1 | E2 = (νn) (E1 | E2) if n /∈ fn(E2) (cont-4)
(νn) m[E] = m[(νn) E] if n 6= m (cont-5)
(νn) 0 = 0 (cont-6)
E1 = E2 ⇒ (νn) E1 = (νn) E2 (cont-7)
E1 = E2 ⇒ E1 | E3 = E2 | E3 (cont-8)
E1 = E2 ⇒ n[E1] = n[E2] (cont-9)
4.2.4 Context Expressions
Table 4.6 details the Context Expressions (CEs in short). The CE True always
indicates the value true. The CE • equates to true for the hole context only. To
explain, it represents the process evaluating that context expression. For the CE
n = m, it applies only if the names n and m are lexically identical, i.e. they match.
Such a CE is vital for examining whether the contents of two messages are identical.
The first order operators ¬ (negation), ∧ (and) and ∃ (there exist) develop their
standard meaning to CEs.
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A CE κ1|κ2 is valid for a context if that context is a parallel composition of two
contexts. These must be such that κ1 holds for one and κ2 holds for the other. A
CE n[κ] holds for a context if that context is an ambient named n such that κ holds
inside that ambient. A CE new nκ holds for a context if that context restricts the
name n to another context for which κ holds. A CE ⊕κ holds for a context on the
condition that the context has a child context for which κ holds. For a CE Gκ to
hold for a context there must be a sub-context present, somewhere in that context,
for which κ holds. The operator G is known as somewhere modality while ⊕ is
known as spatial next modality.
Table 4.6: Syntax of CCA: context expressions
κ Description
True true
• hole
n = m name match
¬κ negation
κ1|κ2 parallel composition
κ1 ∧ κ2 conjunction
newnκ revelation
⊕κ spatial next modality
Gκ somewhere modality
∃x.κ existential quantification
It is possible logically to infer some derivates. For example, False = ¬True,
where both sides implies the value false. The disjunction relation κ1 ∨ κ2 is logi-
cally equivalent to ¬(¬κ1 ∧ ¬κ2). The implication of κ1 ⇒ κ2 can be expressed
as ¬κ1 ∨ κ2, with both having the same logical value. Lastly, a logical equivalence
of two contexts κ1 ⇔ κ2 is equivalent to (κ1 ⇒ κ2) ∧ (κ2 ⇒ κ1).
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4.3 Ambient-based model for CA-UCON model
As depicted in the previous chapter, the CA-UCON model is represented in a finite
state machine in order to show how the requests are handled. Accordingly, the
CA-UCON model consists of the following states: initial state, requesting state,
accessing state, preadaptation state, and onadaptation state. The behaviour of the
user that initiates an access request is also represented by an ambient named subject.
In addition, specific ambients are used to check the authorisation, obligation and
condition requirements. However, in this section, we shall now propose an ambient-
based model for CA-UCON, where each state within CA-UCON is modelled as an
ambient. Below in Figure 4.1, an ambient-based CA-UCON model is provided.
Following this, a description shall be given regarding how to change this graphical
model into its textual equivalent in CCA.
Figure 4.1: Ambient-based Model for CA-UCON Model
We begin our CA-UCON model by representing each entity as an ambient. So,
if the subject submits a request to access an object, the request goes to the request-
ing ambient, which checks for preauthorization, preobligation and precondition. If
preauthorization or preobligation is not met, then the request is denied. However, if
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they are met but the precondition is not met, the system adapts to the new situation
based on the context. This happens in accessing ambient during the access as well.
The above figure is represented textually through the following CCA process:
subject [Psubject ] | requesting [Prequesting ] | accessing [Paccssing ]
preadapting [Ppreadapting ] | onadapting [Ponadapting ]
| preauthorisation[Ppreauthorisation ] | preobligation[Ppreobligation ]
| precondition[Pprecondition ] | onauthorisation[Ponauthorisation ]
| onobligation[Ponobligation ] | oncondition[Poncondition ]
Where Px in this textual model is the process modelling the behaviour of the
related ambient x. These processes are defined in details in the following section.
4.4 Formalising the CA-UCON Model in CCA
Here, we represent the process of formalisation for the CA-UCON model. This
formalisation is based on the functional aspects that control access in order to permit
or deny a service. Therefore, we formalise all the ambients in the CA-UCON model
as well as the interactions among them both before and during the access request
[?]. The CA-UCON formalisation process is illustrated utilizing the mathematical
notation of CCA.
4.4.1 Notation
In the following formalisation process of the CA-UCON model, we use a different
format of letters in order to distinguish between constants and names (variables).
The names written in lowercase letters are known as variables, while the names
written in uppercase letters are known as constants. In Table 4.7 below, the list of
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Table 4.7: Constants
Constants
Notation Description
PERMIT permit the access
DENYA deny Authorisation
DENYB deny Obligation
DENYC deny Condition
REVOKEA revoke Authorisation
REVOKEB revoke Obligation
REVOKEC revoke Condition
END_USAGE terminate usage
ENDED_SUCCESSFULLY usage ended successfully
Table 4.8: Variables
Variables
Notation Description values
s a user id 201,202, 203
o object id lect1, tut3,test4
preA preauthorization 0,1
preB preobligation 0,1
preC precondition 0,1
preD preadaptation 0,1
onA onauthorisation 0,1
onB onobligation 0,1
onC oncondition 0,1
onD onadaptation 0,1
variables is shown and in the subsequent table 4.8, the list of constants is shown.
4.4.2 Subject Ambient
This ambient is responsible for submitting the access request to the requesting am-
bient; it then waits for the reply to this access request, whether permit or deny .
The user eventually ends the usage by sending the message END_USAGE to the
accessing ambient. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
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Psubject =̂ !requesting :: 〈s, o, r〉.requesting :: (reply , o, r).{
(reply = PERMIT )?accessing :: (x, o, r).0
| accessing :: 〈END_USAGE, o, r〉.0
}
Where s is the user id, o the object id and r the access right requested.
4.4.3 Requesting Ambient
This ambient handles all the access requests sent by the subject in order to access
an object. It receives an access request from the subject ambient and checks the
preauthorisation, preobligation and precondition by sending the access request to
the checkPreA, checkPreB and checkPreC ambients, respectively. If the preA and
preB and preC are true (i.e. 1), the subject is permitted to access the requested
object. But if preA (or preB) is not true (i.e. 0), the reply DENYA (or DENYB
respectively) is sent to the subject.
However, if preA and preB are true but preC is false, the request is sent to the
checkPreD ambient in order to adapt to the new situation if possible. The reply
DENYC is sent to the subject if the adaptation fails (i.e. preD = 0). This behaviour
is modelled as follows:
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Prequesing =̂ ! :: (s, o, r).checkPreA :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkPreA :: (preA).
(preA = 1)?checkpPreB :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkPreB :: (preB).
(preB = 1)?checkPreC :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkPreC :: (preC).
(preC = 1)?subject :: 〈PERMIT, o, r〉.
preUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.preUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
|(preC = 0)?preadapting :: 〈s, o, r〉.preadapting :: (preD).
(preD = 1)?subject :: 〈PERMIT, o, r〉.
preUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.preUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
|(preD = 0)?subject :: 〈DENY C, o, r〉.0


|(preB = 0)?subject :: 〈DENY B, o, r〉.0

|(preA = 0)?subject :: 〈DENY A, o, r〉.0

4.4.4 Accessing Ambient
This ambient is responsible for continuously controlling all the permitted access re-
quests that it receives from the requesting ambient. This is achieved through sending
the access request to the checkOnA, checkOnB and checkOnC ambient, and receiv-
ing the reply in the following variables: onA, onB and onC. If onA or onB is false,
the reply REVOKEA or REVOKEB is sent to the subject, respectively.
However, if onA and onB are true but onC is false, the access request is sent
to checkOnD, whereupon it receives the parameter onD ; if this is true, the subject
will be permitted to continue to access the object until the user ends the usage.
Otherwise, the reply REVOKEC is sent to the subject ambient and the usage ter-
minates immediately. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
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Paccessing =̂ ! :: (s, o, r).checkOnA :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkOnA :: (onA).
(onA = 1)?checkOnB :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkOnB :: (onB).
(onB = 1)?checkOnC :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkOnC :: (onC).
(onC = 1)?OnUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.OnUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
|(onC = 0)?Onadapting :: 〈s, o, r〉.Onadapting :: (onD). (onD = 1)?OnUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.OnUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0|(onD = 0)?subject :: 〈REV OKEC, o, r〉.0


|(onB = 0)?subject :: 〈REV OKEB, o, r〉.0

|(onA = 0)?subject :: 〈REV OKEA, o, r〉.0

|subject :: (X).().PostUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.postUpdate :: (X).
subject :: 〈ENDED_SUCCESSFULLY, o, r〉.0
4.4.5 Preadapting Ambient
When the precondition does not hold, the requesting ambient forwards the access
request to this ambient which then attempts to adapt to the context by performing
specific actions. In addition, it is able to issue an alternative request which is ap-
propriate to the current situation. Otherwise, the access request is simply denied,
when no adaptation is possible. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
Ppreadapting =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preD〉.0
where P stands for the pre-adaptation actions or alternative request, which must
be done by the preadapting ambient. The decision is calculated in the variable preD
and sent to the requesting ambient. The actual specification of the process P is
application dependent.
86
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF CA-UCON MODEL IN CCA
4.4.6 Onadapting Ambient
When the oncondition is false during the access, the accessing ambient forwards the
access request to the onadapting ambient which attempts to adapt to the new sit-
uation in order to maintain continuity of usage of the resource. Like the requesting
ambient, it is capable of issuing an alternative request depending on the context. If
no adaptation is possible, the access is simply revoked. This behaviour is modelled
as follows:
Ponadapting =̂ accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onD〉.0
where P stands for on-adaptation actions or alternative request, which must be
performed by the onadapting ambient. The decision is calculated in the variable
onD and sent to the accessing ambient.
4.4.7 CheckPreA Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the requesting ambient and checks
whether the preauthorisation requirements are met by the subject. It then sends
the decision preA to the requesting ambient. This behaviour is achieved as follows:
PcheckPreA =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preA〉.0
where the process P models the preauthorisation requirements, which again are
application dependent.
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4.4.8 CheckPreB Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the requesting ambient and checks
whether the preobligation requirements are met by the subject. Then, it sends the
decision preB to the requesting ambient. This behaviour is achieved as follows:
PcheckPreB =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preB〉.0
where the process P models the preobligation requirements.
4.4.9 CheckPreC Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the requesting ambient and checks
whether the precondition requirements are met by the environment. Then, it sends
the decision preC to the requesting ambient. This behaviour is achieved as follows:
PcheckPreC =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preC〉.0
where the process P represents the precondition requirements.
4.4.10 CheckOnA Ambient
This ambient plays similar role for onauthorisation requirements like the checkPreA
ambient for preauthorisation requirements. The decision whether the onauthorisa-
tion requirements are met is returned to the accessing ambient via the variable onA.
This behaviour is specified as follows:
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PcheckOnA =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onA〉.0
where the process P models the onauthorisation requirements.
4.4.11 CheckOnB Ambient
Similarly to the checkOnA ambient, this ambient plays the same role for onobliga-
tion requirements as the checkPreB ambient for preobligation requirements. The
decision whether the onobligation requirements are met is returned to the accessing
ambient via the variable onB. This behaviour is specified as follows:
PcheckOnB =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onB〉.0
where P represents the onobligation requirements.
4.4.12 CheckOnC Ambient
As for this ambient, it receives an access request from the accessing ambient and
checks whether the oncondition requirements are met by the environment. The deci-
sion is sent to the accessing ambient in the variable onC. This behaviour is specified
as follows:
PcheckOnC =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onC〉.0
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where the process P models the oncondition requirements.
4.5 Summary
This chapter, we introduced the concept of an ambient-based model and described
its characteristics. We then presented the mathematical notation of CCA, including
its syntax, with regard to the capabilities and processes. CCA is an appropriate
mathematical notation for modelling mobile applications that are context-aware. In
addition, we presented the graphical model of CA-UCON model based on ambient
concept. Finally, we demonstrated the formalisation of CA-UCON model with all
external and internal interactions between its components using the CCA notation.
In chapter 5, we will demonstrate the U-learning system as a real world case study
in order to evaluate our CA-UCON model. We then use the execution environment
of CCA to validate the properties of CA-UCON model.
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Case Study
Objectives:
• Present an overview of u-learning system and its infrastructure.
• Present the modelling of u-learning system in CA-UCON.
• Give a CCA specification of the u-learning system.
• Use ccaPL to validate some properties of CA-UCON model.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we evaluate our CA-UCON model with a case study in the ubiqui-
tous learning system (u-learning) in order to show how our model functions in this
environment. Firstly, we give an overview of u-learning systems and the technologies
and infrastructures that have been used in such systems. Secondly, we propose a
CA-UCON model for the u-learning system and specify all the policies. Thirdly, we
provide the formal specifications for this model in CCA; these specifications will be
analysed using the execution environment of CCA, which will demonstrate how the
properties of the CA-UCON model can be validated.
5.2 Ubiquitous Learning (U-Learning)
In this section we provide an overview of u-learning (derived from the literature)
and describe the technologies and infrastructures used in u-learning systems.
5.2.1 Overview
The notion of ubiquitous learning (u-learning) has become more prevalent since the
development of new ICT technologies facilitating ubiquitous computing, and since
electronic communications have become so widespread. However, the reason behind
the recent evolution of u-learning is that there are now increasing demands for dif-
ferent learning methods to solve the challenges of learning in a flexible manner[32].
U-learning is defined as the ability of a ubiquitous computing system to sense the
learner’s situation and to offer him/her adaptive contents based on his/her con-
text (this is called context-awareness). U-learning is described as a special case
of m-learning, with the notion of learning being based on context. Thus, the aim
of u-learning is that it considers the context of the learner in order to provide
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her/him with learning contents at appropriate times and in appropriate situations.
U-learning is similar to m-learning in terms of mobility but u-learning goes beyond
m-learning by including a high level of embeddedness. This is because u-learning is
able to determine the learner’s context using a number of sensors in order to detect
and gather information pertaining to the learner and his/her particular environment
[59][54].
5.2.2 U-learning Technologies and Infrastructure
U-learning is based on an extremely large range of wireless, mobile, wearable,
portable and embedded devices. Figure 5.1 illustrates that u-learning infrastruc-
tural technology has two significant factors: devices that process the information,
and the communication network. In addition, ubiquitous information processing is
incorporated into office and home appliances as well as handheld and mobile devices;
also, they are able to communicate with each other directly [114].
With regards to communication networks, the main distinction is between hetero-
geneity and ad hoc formations. The former indicates that the network is a mixture
of complementary technologies, not just a single technology. This kind of hetero-
geneity is not observable for the learners that use the learning services. In this case,
the network should have a high level of synthetic intelligence in order for it to select
the appropriate technology and the best operational approach for each user-initiated
application. The latter denotes that the network is created based on the needs and
circumstances of the learner, and is not predefined. The idea of ad hoc networks is
that they are applied on network topology with the dynamism constantly changing
[107].
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Figure 5.1: U-learning types of devices and connectivity [114]
94
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY
5.3 Modelling of a U-learning System in CA-UCON
5.3.1 U-learning Services
A u-learning system considers the context of learners, devices, services and environ-
ment in order to provide services such as u-lectures, u-tutorials and u-tests. There-
fore, a u-learning system allows the learners to use their portable devices, such as
smart phones, laptops and PDAs, to connect wirelessly to various wireless networks,
such as Wi-Fi spots, WLANs and 3G terminals, in order to access u-learning services
anytime, anywhere. Thus, the u-learning system delivers the content of services to
the learner as appropriate and adaptable content, based on the current context. A
u-learning system offers the following services:
1. U-Lecture: this kind of service offers learners all possible lecture materials,
which they can request and access through their mobile devices. There are
three different types of u-lecture formats provided by the u-learning system:
text, video and audio. In the u-learning system, each format requires a par-
ticular context in order for it to be delivered to the learner.
2. U-Test: this service is a formal approach for evaluating the learner’s under-
standing of the u-learning content that has been requested and provided. It
assesses the learner’s knowledge and based on the results, the learners receive
feedback to assist them in further u-learning. The learners utilize their mobile
devices in accessing this service.
3. U-Tutorial: this type of service is used by learners to increase their knowledge
in a particular subject; it is a useful service, as it provides an opportunity for
learners to obtain some form of self-assessment and to receive direct and per-
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sonal feedback. This service is a combination of u-lecture and u-test. There are
three different types of u-tutorial formats provided by the u-learning system:
text, video and audio.
5.3.2 Requirements of the u-learning system
A number of different requirements in the u-learning system must be fulfilled for
the learner to gain access. The u-learning system requirements are: authorization
requirements, obligation requirements, condition requirements and adaptation re-
quirements.
5.3.2.1 Authorisation Requirements
The authorisation requirements pertaining to the use of the u-learning system must
be satisfied before the learner is permitted to utilize it, i.e. the learner must be
enrolled. Therefore, we suppose that there are no specific authorisation requirements
in order for the learner to access a service.
5.3.2.2 Obligation requirements
In this section we present the obligation requirements for the u-learning system;
these must be fulfilled before and during the access request. Accordingly, the obli-
gation requirements in the u-learning system are detailed as follows:
B1: The user must register on the module that includes the requested service
before gaining access.
B2: The user must open the module announcement which is related to the requested
service for a duration of 10 seconds.
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5.3.2.3 Condition requirements
Condition requirements within the u-learning paradigm are defined as context re-
quirements; these are considered by the system before and during the access request
in order to permit access and delivery of the requested service to the learner. We
present several condition requirements, as follows:
C1: The u-learning system considers the context of user in order to deliver the
u-service. So, the only u-service format is allowed for a learner in driving context is
the audio format.
C2: In the u-learning system at a university, the context of the learner is classi-
fied as private or public. The public context is defined as learners being in a location
where making a noise is not permitted, such as in a library, seminar or lecture hall.
On the other hand, the private context denotes that the learners are in a location
where making a noise is permitted, such as in a cafe or at home. Therefore, the
system provides u-services in any of the different formats (video, audio or text)
but it considers the learner context before and during the access request. So, the
only u-service format allowed for a learner in a public context is the text format.
However, the system permits access to all the different u-service formats when the
learner context is detected as private.
C3: As above, the u-learning system at a university provides u-services in dif-
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ferent formats (video, audio and text); however, it considers the availability of the
memory of the user’s device before and during the access request. Each u-service
format requires a different amount of space for memory space in order to facilitate
access. If the learner requests a u-service in the video format, audio format or text
format the available memory of the device (before the access request) must be more
than 5MB, 2MB or 1MB respectively for access to be permitted. However, the avail-
able memory of the device (during the access request) must be greater or equal to
1MB for all formats.
C4: In a u-learning system, the battery capacity and bandwidth of the network
are considered when the user requests a u-service in the video format. Therefore, if
the user’s device has a low bandwidth (such as 2G), the battery capacity must be
more than 10% (before the access request) in order for access to the video format
service to commence. However, during the access request the battery capacity must
be more than 5%.
C5: The u-learning system considers the battery capacity before and during the
access request of a u-test. Thus, the u-test service has two forms, which are defined
as part of test and full test. If the user requests a full test, the battery capacity must
be more than 10% in order to access this service. However, the battery capacity
must be more than 5% in order to access part of test
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5.3.2.4 Adaptation requirements
Adaptation requirements are defined as set of adaptation actions that are used by
the system to adapt when conditions do not hold. In the u-learning system, there
are several conditions, which have been explained in the previous section, and these
conditions must be fulfilled before and during the access request. Otherwise, spe-
cific actions are performed by the system in order to adapt to a new situation. In
addition, the system might issue an implicit request to access a specified alternative
object, when there are no adaptation actions available or the adaptation action fails.
Several adaptations are explained in the following paragraphs:
D1: If the context of the user is driving and the requested service is in video or
text formats, the adaptation action is that the system issues an alternative request
in order to deliver audio format instead.
D2: If the user requests the service in video or audio format when s/he is in a
public place, the adaptation action is such that the system issues an alternative
request that enables the user to access the service in text format instead.
D3: Again, if the user requests a u-service in video, audio or text formats, the
required minimum available spaces in the memory are 5MB, 2MB and 1MB, respec-
tively. The adaptation action in this case, if the conditions do not hold, is that
the system activates garbage collector software in an attempt to make more space
available in the memory.
Garbage Collector (GC) is a type of automatic memory management that at-
tempts to dispose of objects or data that are no longer required, releasing the space
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that they had engaged.
D4: if the user requests video or audio format when s/he is using low bandwidth
and battery capacity is less than 10%, the adaptation action (in this case) is such
that the system switches to an available high-bandwidth network.
D5: if the user requests a u-test in ’full test’ format when the battery capacity is
less than 10%, the adaptation action is such that the system issues an alternative
request that delivers a ’part of test’ format to the user instead.
5.3.3 Formalisation in CA-UCON
In this section, we present the formalisation of u-learning services based on the CA-
UCON model. We adopt a finite set S of subjects and a finite set O of objects. The
subjects are learners who are studying at a university and the objects are lecture,
tutorial and test.
5.3.3.1 Right
These are the set of rights that the learner must hold in order to access u-service:
download, submit and write. The download right means that the learner is allowed
to download a u-learning service (such as a u-lecture, u-tutorial or u-test) if all re-
quirements pertaining to this right have been fulfilled. The submit right is used by
the learner to submit a u-test. The write right means that the learner is allowed to
sit a test if the access right has been satisfied.
R= {download, submit, write}
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5.3.3.2 Authorization
This is the authorization predicate, which checks the attributes of the subject and
object in terms of the access right, both before the access and during the access.
In this u-learning system, there are no authorization requirements for accessing the
u-services. So, the authorization predicates are taken to be true. The authorization
predicates are specified as follows:
• PreA(ATT (s), ATT (o), r) = true.
• OnA(ATT (s), ATT (o), r) = true.
5.3.3.3 Obligation
Obligation consists of three elements OBS, OBO and OB. The OBS is the set of
subjects who perform the obligation action, while OBO is the set of objects on which
the obligation is to be performed. The OB is the set of obligation actions that the
subject must perform in order to access the object. Therefore, the obligation is
specified as follows:
• OBS = S.
• OBO = O.
• OB = {register, OpenAnnouncement}.
There are two obligation actions as shown above; the first one is register, which
means that the learner must register with the requested service. The second
obligation action is OpenAnnouncement, which means that when the learner
requests the u-service, s/he must open the module announcement during the
access in order to continue usage of the service.
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• PreOBL ⊆ OBS ×OBO ×OB.
• getPreOBL(s, o, r) = {(s, o, register)}.
This function means that for each user who would like to access any service by
using any right, s/he has to register to the module which includes the requested
service.
• OnOBL ⊆ OBS ×OBO ×OB × T
• getOnOBL(s, o, r) = {(s, o, OpenAnnouncement, 10)}.
This function means that each user has to open the module announcement for
at least 10 seconds in order to continue the usage of the service.
• PreB(s, o, r)⇒ PreFulfilled(getPreOBL(s, o, r)).
• allowed(s, o, r)⇒ PreB(s, o, r).
• OnB(s, o, r)⇒ OnFulfilled(getOnOBL(s, o, r)).
• stopped(s, o, r)⇐ ¬onB(s, o, r).
5.3.3.4 Condition
We use a variable StudentContext to denote the context of learner; its possible val-
ues are: driving, when the context of the learner is driving ; public, when the context
of the learner is in a public place and private, when the context of the learner is in
private place. Accordingly, the conditions are specified as follows:
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C1: The user should not be driving when requesting a u-video or u-text service.
This is specified by the condition:
(StudentContext 6= driving) (5.1)
C2: To access a u-video or u-audio, the user must be in a private place. This is
specified by the condition:
(StudentContext = Private) (5.2)
C3: The user must have sufficient memory available on her/his mobile device,
which must be more than 5MB if s/he requests the service in video format, more
than 2MB if in audio, and more than 1MB if the requested service is in text format
before the access request. However, during the access the memory available must
be greater or equal to 1MB for all formats. We use the variable AvailableMemory
to denote the amount of free space available in the memory. This is specified by the
conditions:
(AvailableMemory > 5MB) (5.3)
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(AvailableMemory > 2MB) (5.4)
(AvailableMemory > 1MB) (5.5)
(AvailableMemory >= 1MB) (5.6)
C4: The user may not access the service in video format, if s/he is using a low
bandwidth network and the battery capacity is less than 10% before and during the
access request. We use the variable Bandwidth to denote the signal bandwidth being
used for the communication, while we use the variable BatteryCapacity to denote
how much power the device has.
This is specified by the condition:
(Bandwidth = high ∨BatteryCapacity > 10%) (5.7)
C5: The user may not access a full u-test if the battery capacity is less than
10%.
This is specified by the condition:
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(BatteryCapacity > 10%) (5.8)
PreCon={Eq.(5.1),Eq.(5.2),Eq.(5.3),Eq.(5.4),Eq.(5.5),Eq.(5.7),Eq.(5.8)}
OnCon={Eq.(5.1),Eq.(5.2),Eq.(5.6),Eq.(5.7),Eq.(5.8)}
5.3.3.5 Adaptation
Adaptation requirements are a set of adaptation actions that are used by the system
to adapt when specific conditions do not hold. In particular, there are four adap-
tation actions: AdaptToVideo, AdaptToAudio, AdaptToText and skip. We use the
variable gc to model the garbage collector; this variable can only have two values:
1 (to mean that the garbage collector is activated) or 0 (to deactivate it). The ac-
tion skip does nothing and lasts for only one time-unit. The adaptation actions are
specified as follows:
AD= {AdaptToVideo, AdaptToAudio, AdaptToText, Skip}.
We partition the set O of objects as follows:
O = Ovideo
⋃
Oaudio
⋃
Otext.
where Ovideo is the set of video versions of u-lecture, u-tutorial and u-test; Oaudio
is the set of audio versions of u-lecture, u-tutorial and u-test; and Otext is the set of
text versions of u-lecture, u-tutorial and u-test.
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getPreADAPT(s, o, r) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where c is the set of all precon-
ditions required to grant the subject s the access right r upon the object o, a is the
adaptation action to be performed if any of the pre-conditions do not hold, and t is
the time-out for this adaptation process.
getOnADAPT(s,o, r ) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where c is the set of all ongoing-
conditions required for the subject s to keep the right r upon the object o during
access, a is the adaptation action to be performed if any of the ongoing-conditions
does not hold, and t is the time-out for this adaptation process.
getPreADAPT (s, o, download) = getOnADAPT (s, o, download) = ({Eq.(5.1), Eq.(5.2),
Eq.(5.3), Eq.(5.7)}, AdaptToV ideo, 5)
(5.9)
for o ∈ Ovideo
This function means that if the user requests the video format and if one (or all) of
these Eq.(5.1),Eq.(5.2), Eq.(5.3), Eq.(5.7) conditions do not hold, the system will
adapt by performing the function AdaptToVideo; for a duration of 5 seconds. We
suppose that the time taken for the AdaptToVideo action to be performed in this
system is 5 seconds.
The action AdaptToVideo is defined as follows:
AdaptToVideo = (if¬(Eq.(5.1)) then Skip
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|| if¬(Eq.(5.2)) then Skip
|| if¬(Eq.(5.3)) then gc := 1
|| if¬(Eq.(5.7)) then Bandwidth := high
)
The function AdaptToVideo performs the action Skip, if the context of the user
is driving or public. However, the action gc:=1 is performed if the AvailableMemory
less or equal to 5 MB which means that turn on the Garbage collector. The action
Bandwidth:= high is performed if the bandwidth is low.
getPreADAPT (s, o, download) = getOnADAPT (s, o, download) = ({Eq.(5.2),
Eq.(5.4)}, AdaptToAudio, 4)
(5.10)
for o ∈ Oaudio
This function means that if the user requests the audio format and if one (or all) of
these Eq.(5.2), Eq.(5.4) conditions do not hold, the system will adapt by performing
the function AdaptToAudio; for a duration 4 seconds. We suppose that the time
taken for the AdaptToAudio action to be performed in this system is 4 seconds.
The action AdaptToAudio is defined as follows:
AdaptToAudio = (if¬(Eq.(5.2)) then Skip
|| if¬(Eq.(5.4)) then gc := 1
)
The function AdaptToAudio performs the action Skip, if the context of the user
107
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY
is public. However, the action gc:=1 is performed if the AvailableMemory less or
equal to 2 MB which means that turn on the Garbage collector.
getPreADAPT (s, o, download) = getOnADAPT (s, o, download) = ({Eq.(5.1),
Eq.(5.5)}, AdaptToText, 3)
(5.11)
for o ∈ Otext
This function means that if the user requests the text format and if one (or all) of
these Eq.(5.1), Eq.(5.5) conditions do not hold, the system will adapt by performing
the function AdaptToText ; for a duration of 3 seconds. We suppose that the time
taken for the AdaptToText action to be performed in this system is 3 seconds.
The action AdaptToText is defined as follows:
AdaptToText = (if¬(Eq.(5.1)) then Skip
|| if¬(Eq.(5.5)) then gc := 1
)
The function AdaptToText performs the action Skip, if the context of the user
is driving. However, the action gc:=1 is performed if the AvailableMemory less or
equal to 1 MB which means that turn on the Garbage collector.
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getPreADAPT (s, o, download) = getOnADAPT (s, o, download) = ({Eq.(5.8)}, skip, 1)
(5.12)
for O ∈ Otest
This function means that if the user requests a u-test service and if the Eq.(5.8)
condition does not hold, which is in this case would be that the battery capacity
is less than 10%, the system will perform the skip action for a duration 1 second,
because the system is unable to make this condition true. However, an alternative
request will be issued by system as detailed below.
getPreAltReq(s, o, r) this denotes the set of alternative requests that can be
made on behalf of the subject s when the initial request of the access right r upon
the object o fails before access due to environmental conditions.
getOnAltReq(s, o, r) denotes the set of alternative requests that can be made
on behalf of the subject s when the initial request of the access right r upon the
object o fails during access due to environmental conditions.
For the sake of simplicity, we will use the following functions:
V ideo : O −→ Ovideo; video(o)= the video version of object(o).
Audio : O −→ Oaudio; audio(o)= the audio version of object(o).
Text : O −→ Otext; text(o)= the text version of object(o).
PartOfTest : O −→ Opartoftest; PartOfTest(o)= the part of the test version of
object(o).
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getPreAltReq(s, o, download) = getOnAltReq(s, o, download) = {(Audio(o), download)}
(5.13)
for o ∈ Ovideo
⋃
Otext
In the functions above, if the user requests a u-service the video or text format
when driving, in this case the condition does not hold; the system then issues an
alternative request, which delivers that u-service in the audio format instead.
getPreAltReq(s, o, download) = getOnAltReq(s, o, download) = {(Text(o), download)}
(5.14)
for o ∈ Ovideo
⋃
Oaudio
The functions above mean that if the user requests a u-service in the video or
audio format when in a public place, the system then issues an alternative request,
which delivers that u-service in the text format instead.
getPreAltReq(s, o, download) = getOnAltReq(s, o, download) = {(PartOfTest(o), download)}
(5.15)
for o ∈ Otest
This function means that if the user requests a u-test service and if the condition
does not hold, the system then issues an alternative request, which in this case means
that the system delivers the ’part of test’ form.
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PreD(s, o, r) = PreAdapted(getPreADAPT(s, o, r)).
This is the adaptation predicate; it takes the form of true or false, which means
that if the adaptation process is successful, ’true’ will be returned, otherwise ’false’
is returned.
The access permission decision is defined as:
allowed(s, o, r)⇒ preD(s, o, r);
This predicate denotes that the subject s is granted the right r to access the object
o, if the adaptation process for this access request is successful.
ended(s , o, r)⇒

¬preD(s, o, r)
∧∨
(o′,r′)∈E
allowed(s , o ′, r ′)

This predicate denotes that the right r requested by the subject s to access the
object o is ended, if the predicate preD is false and an alternative request is issued.
where E = getPreAltReq(s , o, r) and the symbol ‘⇒’ denotes the logical implication.
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5.4 Formal specification in CCA
We now present the formalisation process of the CA-UCON model used in case study
above (i.e. in a u-learning system). This formalisation process is completed utilizing
the CCA notation explained in the previous chapter. We formalise and highlight
the important parts of this case study, which are represented by Adaptation and
Conditions.
5.4.1 CheckPreC Ambient
This ambient receives the request from requesting ambient in order to check the
condition of the current request, which in this case is the format of the u-service
and the context of the mobile user. Thus, the checkPreC ambient senses the context
of the user, the memory size of the mobile device and the bandwidth of the network,
and then sends the context, fm and bandwidth parameters to the SubjectCxt, Mem-
orySize and Bandwidth ambients, respectively. Then, if the u-lecture is in video or
text format and the context of the user is driving, and if the memory size of the
mobile device is more than 2MB, the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter
AltA to the requesting ambient; the latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient
for adaptation.
However, if the u-lecture is in video or audio format and the context of the user
is in a public place, and if the memory size of the mobile device is more than 1MB,
the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter AltT to the requesting ambient; the
latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient for adaptation. If the u-lecture is
in video or text format and the context of the user is driving, and if the memory
size of the mobile device is less than or equal to 2MB, the checkPreC ambient will
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send the parameter AltA1 to the requesting ambient; the latter then sends it to the
preadapting ambient for adaptation. If the u-lecture is in video or audio format and
the context of the user is in a public place, and if the memory size of the mobile
device is less than or equal to 1MB, the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter
AltT1 to the requesting ambient; the latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient
for adaptation.
If the u-lecture is in video format and the context of the user is private, and if
the memory size of the mobile device is more than 5MB and the bandwidth is low,
the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter action1 to the requesting ambient;
the latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient for adaptation. If the u-lecture
is in video format and the context of the user is private, and if the memory size of
the mobile device is less than or equal to 5MB and bandwidth is low, the checkPreC
ambient will send the parameter action2 to the requesting ambient; the latter then
sends it to the preadapting ambient for adaptation.
If the u-lecture is in audio format and the context of the user is private, and if
the memory size of the mobile device is less than or equal to 2MB, the checkPreC
ambient will send the parameter action2 to the requesting ambient; the latter then
sends it to the preadapting ambient for adaptation. If the u-lecture is in text format
and the context of the user is private, and if the memory size of the mobile device is
less than or equal to 1MB, the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter action2
to the requesting ambient; the latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient for
adaptation. If the u-lecture is in video format and the context of the user is pri-
vate, and if the memory size of the mobile device is less than or equal to 5MB and
bandwidth is low, the checkPreC ambient will send the parameter action3 to the
requesting ambient; the latter then sends it to the preadapting ambient for adapta-
tion. Otherwise, the checkPreC ambient will send 1 to the requesting ambient; the
latter then sends it to the accessing ambient. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
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PcheckPreC =̂ !requesting :: (requesterid, lectFormat, download).subjectCxt ↓ 〈requesterid〉.
subjectCxt ↓ (req, context).MemorySize ↓ 〈requesterid〉.MemorySize ↓ (req, fm).
Bandwidth ↓ 〈requesterid〉.Bandwidth ↓ (req, bandwidth).
(lectFormat = video) ∧ (context = driving) ∧ (fm > 2)?requesting :: 〈AltA〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (context = public) ∧ (fm > 1)?requesting :: 〈AltT 〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (¬(context = driving)) ∨ (¬(context = piblic)) ∧ (fm > 5)
∧(bandwidth = high)?requesting :: 〈1〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (context = driving) ∧ (fm <= 2)?requesting :: 〈AltA1〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (¬(context = public) ∨ (context = driving)) ∧ (fm <= 5)
∧(bandwidth = high)?requesting :: 〈Action2〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (context = public) ∧ (fm <= 1)?requesting :: 〈AltT1〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (¬(context = public) ∨ (context = driving)) ∧ (bandwidth = low)
∧(fm > 5)?requesting :: 〈Action1〉.0
|(lectFormat = video) ∧ (¬(context = public)) ∨ (context = driving) ∧ (fm <= 5)∧
(bandwidth = low)?requesting :: 〈Action3〉.0
|(lectFormat = audio) ∧ (context = public) ∧ (fm > 1)?requesting :: 〈AltT 〉.0
|(lectFormat = audio) ∧ (context = public) ∧ (fm <= 1) >?requesting :: 〈AltT1〉.0
|(lectFormat = audio) ∧ (¬(context = public)) ∧ (fm > 2)?requesting :: 〈1〉.0
|(lectFormat = audio) ∧ (¬(context = public)) ∧ (fm <= 2)?requesting :: 〈Action2〉.0
|(lectFormat = text) ∧ (context = driving) ∧ (fm > 2)?requesting :: 〈AltA〉.0
|(lectFormat = text) ∧ (¬(context = driving)) ∧ (fm > 1)?requesting :: 〈1〉.0
|(lectFormat = text) ∧ (¬(context = driving)) ∧ (fm <= 1)?requesting :: 〈Action2〉.0
|(lectFormat = text) ∧ (context = driving) ∧ (fm <= 2)?requesting :: 〈AltA1〉.0

(5.16)
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5.4.1.1 SubjectCxt Ambient
This ambient receives the parameter requesterid from the checkPreC ambient; this
parameter represents the ID of the subject. The SubjectCxt ambient sends the
parameters requesterid and context back to the checkPreC ambient, which represent
that the ID of the subject and his/her context. We model this ambient as the
simulation of a sensor in the real world, which randomly gives the context of subject.
PsubjectCxt =̂ ! ↑ (requesterid).
↑ 〈requesterid, driving〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, private〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, Public〉.0

5.4.1.2 MemorySize Ambient
This ambient receives the parameter requesterid from the checkPreC ambient; this
parameter represents the ID of the mobile user. We use the variable fm to denote
the free memory of mobile device. The MemorySize ambient sends the parameters
requesterid and fm back to the checkPreC ambient, which represent the ID of the
mobile user and the memory size of his/her device. We model this ambient as the
simulation of a sensor in the real world, which gives the memory size of the mobile
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device in a random manner.
PMemorySize =̂ ! ↑ (requesterid).
↑ 〈requesterid, 4〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, 7〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, 3〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, 8〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, 0〉.0|
↑ 〈requesterid, 5〉.0

5.4.1.3 Bandwidth Ambient
This ambient receives the parameter requesterid from the checkPreC ambient; this
parameter represents the ID of the mobile user. We use the variable bandwidth
to denote the network bandwidth. The Bandwidth ambient sends the parameters
requesterid and bandwidth back to the checkPreC ambient, which together repre-
sent the ID of the mobile user and the bandwidth of the network being used. We
model this ambient as the simulation of a sensor in the real world, which gives the
bandwidth of the network being used by the mobile device in a random manner.
PBandwidth =̂ ! ↑ (requesterid). ↑ 〈requesterid, low〉.0|↑ 〈requesterid, high〉.0|

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5.4.2 GC Ambient
This ambient represents the behaviour of the Garbage Collector software, which is
requested from the preadapting ambient in order to turn on the GC ambient to
make more space available in the memory device. The GC ambient receives the
parameter Areply from the preadapting ambient, and if Areply is memoryislow, the
GC ambient will start working for a duration of 5 seconds. Following this, the
GC ambient sends the parameter checkfm to the FMem ambient and receives the
parameter fm from the FMem ambient which is the memory capacity and sends it
back to the preadapting ambient. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
PGC =̂

!preadapting :: (Areply).
(Areply =MemoryisLow) ?FMem :: 〈checkfm〉.
FMem :: (fm).perAdapting :: 〈fm〉.0
 (5.17)
5.4.3 preadapting Ambient
This ambient receives the request from the requesting ambient, which means that the
conditions for this request have not been fulfilled in order to access the service. So,
the current request needs to be adapted to the new situation based on the current
context of the mobile user. If the reply is AltA, the preadapting ambient issues an
alternative request and sends the u-service in the audio format along with 1 to the
requesting ambient; this means that the adaptation has been successful. However,
if the reply is AltA1, the preadapting ambient sends the parameter memoryisLow to
the GC ambient in order to increase the memory capacity of the mobile device; it
then receives the parameter fm, and if fm is more than 2MB, the audio format will
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be sent along with 1 to the requesting ambient, which means that the adaptation
has been successful. Otherwise, 0 along with the audio format will be sent to the
requesting ambient, which means that the adaptation has failed.
However, if the reply is AltT, the preadapting ambient issues an alternative re-
quest and sends the text format along with 1 to the requesting ambient, which
means that the adaptation has been successful. However, if the reply is AltT1, the
preadapting ambient sends the parameter memoryisLow to the GC ambient in order
to increase the memory capacity of the mobile device; the preadapting ambient then
receives the parameter fm, and if fm is more than 1MB, the text format will be sent
along with 1 to the requesting ambient, which means that the adaptation has been
successful. Otherwise, 0 along with the text format will be sent to the requesting
ambient, which means that the adaptation has failed.
If the reply is action1, it means that the bandwidth of the network being used
by the mobile device is low; the preadapting ambient then sends the parameter
bandwidthislow to the HB ambient in order to switch to a high bandwidth network.
If HBreply returns with ’high’, the video format together with 1 is sent to the
requesting ambient. Otherwise, 0 is sent to the requesting ambient (as a result of
adaptation failure). If the reply is action2, it means that the memory size of the mo-
bile device is low; the preadapting ambient then sends the parameter memoryislow
to the GC ambient in order to increase the capacity of the memory. If fm is greater
than requested, the requested format together with 1 is sent to the requesting ambi-
ent. Otherwise, 0 is sent to the requesting ambient (as a result of adaptation failure).
If the reply is action3, it means that the network bandwidth being used by the
mobile device is low and that the memory capacity is low. In this case, the preadapt-
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ing ambient sends the parameters bandwidthislow and memoryislow to the HB and
GC ambients, respectively, in order to switch to a high bandwidth network and to
increase the memory capacity. If HBreply is returned with ’high’ and fm is greater
than requested, the video format together with 1 is sent to the requesting ambient.
Otherwise, 0 is sent to the requesting ambient (as a result of adaptation failure).
This behaviour is modelled as follows:
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Ppreadapting =̂ !requesting :: (requesterid, lectFormat, download, reply).{(5.18)|(5.19)}
Where:

(reply = AltA) ? requesting :: 〈1, audio〉.0
|(reply = AltA1) ? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm > 2)? requesting :: 〈1, audio〉.0|(fm <= 2)? requesting :: 〈0, audio〉.0

|(reply = AltT ) ? requesting :: 〈1, text〉.0
|(reply = AltT1) ? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm <= 1)? requesting :: 〈0, text〉.0|(fm > 1)? requesting :: 〈1, text〉.0

|(reply = Action1)? HB :: 〈bandwidthislow〉.HB :: (HBreply). (HBreply = high)? requesting :: 〈1, video〉.0|(HBreply = low)? requesting :: 〈0, video〉.0

|(reply = Action2) and (lectFormat = video)? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm > 5)? requesting :: 〈1, video〉.0|(fm <= 5)? requesting :: 〈0, video〉.0

|(reply = Action2) and (lectFormat = audio)? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm > 2)? requesting :: 〈1, audio〉.0|(fm <= 2)? requesting :: 〈0, audio〉.0


(5.18)
120
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY

(reply = Action2) and (lectFormat = text)? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm > 1)? requesting :: 〈1, text〉.0|(fm <= 1)? requesting :: 〈0, text〉.0

|(reply = Action3)? HB :: 〈bandwidthislow〉.HB :: (HBreply).
(not(HBreply = high))? requesting :: 〈0, video〉.0
|(HBreply = high)? GC :: 〈MemoryisLow〉.GC :: (fm). (fm <= 5)? requesting :: 〈0, video〉.0|(fm > 5)? requesting :: 〈1, video〉.0



(5.19)
5.4.4 Subject Ambient
This ambient sends the request with the parameters (requesterid, lectFormat, down-
load) to the requesting ambient in order to access the service. The requesterid
parameter is used to create a user profile. The lectFormat parameter represents
the lecture format that the user has requested. The download parameter represents
the right requested by the user. Thus, the subject ambient receives a reply from
the requesting ambient, which is permit if all the requirements have been fulfilled
or deny if otherwise. The user eventually ends the usage by sending the message
END_USAGE to the accessing ambient. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
Psubject =̂ !requesting :: 〈P1, video, download〉.requesting :: (reply , video, download).{
(reply = PERMIT )?accessing :: (x, o, r).0
| accessing :: 〈END_USAGE, video, download〉.0
}
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5.4.5 FMem Ambient
This ambient receives the parameters reply from the GC ambient to checks the mem-
ory capacity of the mobile device. Then, the FMem ambient sends the parameter fm,
which is the memory capacity, back to the GC ambient. We model this ambient by
using a random function that gives the capacity of the memory in a random manner,
as the simulation of a sensor in the real world. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
PFMem =̂ !GC :: (reply).GC :: 〈fm〉.0
5.4.6 HB Ambient
This ambient represents the behaviour of the network bandwidth. The HB ambi-
ent receives the parameter Areply from the preadapting ambient, and if Areply is
bandwidthislow, the HB ambient attempts to switch from a low bandwidth to a high
bandwidth in the mobile device. We model this ambient using a random function
that gives the bandwidth of the network in a random manner, as the simulation of
a sensor in the real world. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
PHB =̂
 !preadapting :: (Areply).(Areply = bandwidthisLow) ?preadapting :: 〈HBreply〉.0
 (5.20)
5.5 Validation
In this section, we present the validation of our CA-UCON model vis-a-vis the above
case study (u-learning system). We illustrate how CA-UCON model properties can
be validated using the execution environment of CCA [96]. Firstly, we present the
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syntax and the execution environment of ccaPL. We then devise scenarios and ex-
ecute them in order to validate two main classes of system properties as proposed
by [71]:
Safety property: stating that nothing bad will happen.
Liveness property: stating that something good will happen, eventually
For the evaluation of our system we do not use the a metric (benchmark) because
the CCA is used to validate the above mentioned properties: Safety property and
Liveness property. Therefore, CCA is powerful language which has an execution
environment that can easy run the formal specification of mobile and context-aware
system to validate its properties. We advise a different scenarios and execute them
to validate a various properties of the system.
5.5.1 ccaPL: A Programming Language for CCA
In the previous chapter, we presented the mathematical notation of CCA. It is ap-
propriate notation for modelling systems that are mobile and context-aware. Our
CA-UCON model is modelled by using the CCA notation. In the following sub-
sections the syntax, context expression and execution environment of ccaPL are
presented.
5.5.1.1 Syntax of ccaPL
Using a normal text editor for reproducing the syntax of CCA is difficult because
of the special symbols that are used in the syntax of CCA (eg.′ ↑′ and ′ ↓′). Thus,
the syntax of ccaPL is presented in a manner that is readable by the computer.
Capabilities, processes and locations are shown in Tables 5.1,5.2, 5.3 below.
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Table 5.1: Capabilities of ccaPL
Capabilities M
CCA ccaPL Description
in n in n move into ambient n
out out move out
del n del n delete ambient n
α x〈z˜〉 (α )x(z˜) call to the process abstraction x
α (y˜) (α )recv(y˜) receive list of messages y˜ from α
α 〈y˜〉 (α )send(z˜) send list of messages z˜ to α
Table 5.2: Processes of ccaPL
Processes P
CCA ccaPL Description
0 0 inactivity
n[P ] n[P ] ambient x
P |Q P |Q parallel composition
!P !(P ) replication
(νn) P new n (P) restriction
κ?M.P < k > M.P context-guarded capability
x . (y˜).P proc x(y˜).P process abstraction x
{P} {P} brackets
Table 5.3: Location of ccaPL
Location α
CCA ccaPL Description
↑ @ any parent
n ↑ n@ parent n
↓ # any child
n ↓ n# child n
:: :: any sibling
n :: n :: sibling n
  locally
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5.5.1.2 Context Expressions in ccaPL
In Table 5.4 below the context expressions of ccaPL are shown. In ccaPL the non
readable symbols which are utilized by CCA are changed to readable one that can
be written in normal text editor in order to represent context expression in a usual
manner.
Table 5.4: Context Expressions of ccaPL
Context Expressions κ
CCA ccaPL Description
T true true
n = m n = m name match
• this hole
¬κ not(κ) negation
κ1|κ2 κ1|κ2 parallel composition
κ1 ∨ κ2 κ1 or κ2 disjunction
κ1 ∧ κ2 κ1 and κ2 conjunction
⊕κ next (κ) spatial next modality
Gκ somewhere (κ) somewhere modality
5.5.1.3 ccaPL Execution Environment
The architecture of the execution environment of ccaPL is shown in Figure 5.2 below.
This architecture consists of the following components: editor, parser, interpreter,
manager and console. The editor component represents the development environ-
ment of the CCA program, which allows the user to write a CCA program in a
normal text editor. The second component is the parser, which is developed by uti-
lizing JavaCC (Java Compiler Compiler); the responsibility of this component is to
verify the syntax of any program that is written in ccaPL. The manager component
is mange the console and the interpreter components. The next component is the
interpreter; the responsibility of this component is the execution of the program in
ccaPL, based on CCA reduction semantics. The last component is the console; this
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is considered as part of the execution environment and is currently being created.
Figure 5.2: The architecture of the execution environment of ccaPL [96]
The comments can be written in ccaPL program using this symbol "//" if it is
a single line commentary or between these symbol "/*","*/" if it is multiple lines
commentary. So, the JDK (Java Development Kit) has to be installed in computer
in order to use the execution environment to execute ccaPL program. The following
example below shows how the ccaPL program is written:
BEGIN_DECLS
def has(n) = this | n[true] | true
END_DECLS
// Here goes the program
Abdul[::recv(sder,x).<x=hello or x=hi>let y = thanks_+sder in sder::send(y).0]
|
francois[::send(francois, hello).::recv(ack).0]
The declaration section of a ccaPL program starts with key word "BEGIN_DECLS"
and ending with another key word "END_DECLS", these key words must be writ-
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ten in capital letters. This is an optional section and is used to define the context
expression.
In order to present how the execution environment of ccaPL works in practice,
we will execute the above instance. The Figure 5.3 below shows the result of the
execution of the above example.
Figure 5.3: Reduction relation of execution environment of ccaPL
Now, the output of an execution will be explained as follows: the meaning of
the symbol ′ −−−−− >′ is the reduction relation of CCA as described in [96]. A
pair of curly brackets contains the explanation of each transition, which describes
the relationship between the ambients, such as "Parent to child", "Child to par-
ent" and "Sibling to sibling". In addition, it specifies the sender and the receiver
as well as the massage exchanged between them. For example, the notation C
======(X)===== > D represents that an ambient C sent a message ’X’ to
ambient D.
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5.5.2 Executing Scenarios
In following paragraphs, we design a different scenarios and execute them in order to
validate properties of CA-UCON model in u-learning system. The two main classes
of system properties are safety property and liveness property:
Scenario 1: the property to validate in this scenario is : " if the pre-authorization
or the pre-obligation requirement is not met before the access, then the access request
will be denied by the system". Suppose a learner requests to download a u-lecture
in the video format and the context of learner is in private place and the memory
capacity of her/his mobile device is more than 5MB. However, the pre-obligation
requirements of this access request are not met. In this case, the system has to deny
the access request.
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Figure 5.4: Execution of Scenario 1
Figure 5.4 illustrates the execution of scenario 1. The subject sends the access
request containing the subject ID, the u-lecture in the video format and the down-
loading right to the requesting ambient (line 2). The requesting ambient receives
the access request and checks the pre-obligation pertaining to this request (line 3).
So, the pre-obligation of this request is not met, and finally the system denied the
access request (lines 4-5). So, it can be seen from this scenario the safety property
is validated because the system deny the request if the pre-obligation is not met.
Scenario 2: The property to validate in this scenario is : " if the pre-authorization,
pre-obligation and pre-condition requirements are met at the time of access request
and on-authorization, on-obligation and on-condition requirements continuously hold
during the access, the access will end successfully". Suppose a learner requests to
download a u-lecture in the video format and the context of learner is in private
place and the memory capacity of her/his mobile device is more than 5MB. The
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service will be delivered to the learner by the system.
Figure 5.5: Execution of Scenario2
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Figure 5.5 presents a screen shot of the execution of Scenario 2, from which it can
be seen that the subject sends the access request to the requesting ambient (line 2).
The requesting ambient receives the access request and checks the pre-authorisation,
pre-obligation and pre-conditions pertaining to this request (lines 3-8). The ambi-
ent checkPreC checks the context of the subject, the memory capacity of the mobile
device and the bandwidth of the network before access. In this case, all the require-
ments before the access are met and the access is permit to the service(lines 16).
Moreover, the requesting ambient sends the access request to accessing ambient to
check on-authorisation, on-obligation and on-conditions pertaining to this request,
and all requirements are hold during the access (lines 22-27). In line(33) The sub-
ject ended the access successfully by sending this message END_USAGE to the
accessing ambient.
Scenario 3: The property we want to validate in this scenario is : " if the pre-
authorization and pre-obligation requirements are met, but the pre-condition require-
ments are not met and the pre-adaptation is successful, eventually the access request
will be permit". Suppose a learner sends a request to download a u-lecture in video
format and the context of learner is in private place and the memory capacity of
mobile device is less than 5MB. One condition for this service is that the available
memory in the mobile device must be more than 5MB. This condition is not met
by the current context, so the system will turn on a garbage collector (GC ) in an
attempt to generate sufficient space to allow the downloading of the service to take
place.
131
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY
Figure 5.6: Execution of Scenario 3
Figure 5.6 illustrates that the execution of Scenario 3. The subject sends the
access request containing the subject ID, the u-lecture in the video format and the
downloading right to the requesting ambient (line 1), whereupon the requesting ambi-
ent receives the access request and then checks the pre-authorisation, pre-obligation
and pre-conditions pertaining to this request (lines 3-8). The ambient checkPreC
checks the context of the subject, the memory capacity of the mobile device and the
bandwidth of network (lines 9-14). In this case, the available memory on the mobile
device is less than 5MB (line 12), which means that the system has to adapt to a
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new situation. A garbage collector is activated to free more memory space (lines
15-20). The pre-adaptation is successful and the available memory space is increased
to 6MB as shown in (line 21) and the video format is then delivered (line 24). So, it
can be seen from this scenario the liveness property is validated because the system
adapts to new situation in order to continue the access for the user.
Scenario 4: The property to validate in this scenario is : " if the pre-authorization
and the pre-obligation requirement is met, but the pre-condition requirement is not
met and the pre-adaptation fails, eventually the access request will be denied". Sup-
pose a learner requests a u-tutorial in the video format in a private place and that
the memory capacity of the mobile device is more than 5MB. However, she/he is
using a low bandwidth network in attempting to download the video, which means
that the condition to download this service is not met. Therefore, the system adapts
to this new situation by switching the mobile device to a high bandwidth network
in order to download this service.
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Figure 5.7: Execution of Scenario 4
The execution of Scenario 4 is illustrated in Figure 5.7 the subject sends the
access request containing the subject ID, the u-lecture in the video format and
the downloading right to the requesting ambient (line 1). The requesting ambient
receives the access request and then checks the pre-authorization, pre-obligation
and pre-conditions pertaining to this request (lines 3-8). The ambient checkPreC
checks the context of the subject, the memory capacity of the mobile device and
the bandwidth of the network (lines 11-14). In this scenario, the bandwidth of the
network is low (line 14), so the system has adapt to this new situation by sending
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the parameter Action1 with the request to the pre-adapting ambient (line 16) in
order to switch to a high bandwidth. Then, the pre-adapting ambient receives the
current bandwidth of the network from the HB ambient is low bandwidth which the
adaptation is fail(line 20). Finally, the system is deny the service(line 22).
Scenario 5: In this scenario the property will be validated is : " if the pre-
authorization, pre-obligation and pre-condition requirements are met, but the on-
authorization or on-obligation requirements fails, the access will be revoked by the
system". Suppose a learner sends a request to download a u-tutorial in the text
format to her/his mobile device when s/he in a public place and that the memory
capacity of the device is more than 1MB. However, the on-authorization require-
ments are not hold, the system will revoke the access.
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Figure 5.8: Execution of Scenario 5
Figure 5.8 illustrates the execution of Scenario 5: the subject sends the access
request containing the subject ID, the u-tutorial in the text format and the down-
loading right to the requesting ambient (line 1). The requesting ambient receives
the access request and then checks the pre-authorisation, pre-obligation and pre-
conditions pertaining to this request (lines 2-8). The ambient checkPreC checks the
context of the subject, the memory capacity of the mobile device and the bandwidth
of the network (lines 9-15). So, in this case all requirements before the access are
met and the access request is permit (line 16). However, the system checks on-
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authorization during the access and it is not hold (lines 24-25). Finally, the system
revokes the access (line 26).
Scenario 6: the property to validate in this scenario is : " if the on-condition
requirements do not hold during the access and the on-adaptation is successful, the
access will continue". Suppose a learner requests a u-tutorial in the video format
in a private place and that the memory capacity of the mobile device is more than
5MB and using a high bandwidth at the time of request which means that all pre-
condition requirements are met by current context. When the system gives the
permission to the learner in order to download the video format, she/he starts using
a low bandwidth network in attempting to download the video, which means that the
on-condition requirements to download this service are not hold based on u-learning
system policies. Therefore, the system adapts to this new situation by switching the
mobile device to a high bandwidth network in order to download this service.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the execution of Scenario 6: the subject sends the ac-
cess request containing the subject ID, the u-tutorial in the video format and the
downloading right to the requesting ambient (line 1). The requesting ambient re-
ceives the access request and then checks the pre-authorisation, pre-obligation and
pre-conditions requirements pertaining to this request (lines 2-15). Here, the pre-
authorisation, pre-obligation and pre-conditions requirements are met and system
gives the permission to the learner to download the service (line 16). The ac-
cessing ambient receives the access request and then checks the on-authorisation,
on-obligation and on-condition requirements pertaining to this request during the
access line(19-30). As the bandwidth is low during the access(line 30), and it is not
allowed to access the video format in this context, the system has to adapt to a
new situation; it does so by sending the parameter Action1 with an access request
to the onadapting ambient (lines 31-35) in order to switch to a high bandwidth.
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Figure 5.9: Execution of Scenario 6
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Then, the onadapting ambient receives the current bandwidth of the network from
the HB ambient, which becomes a high one (line 34). This means the on-adaptation
is successful and the access is continue (line 35).
Scenario 7: In this scenario the property to validate is " if the on-condition re-
quirements do not hold during the access and the on-adaptation fails, the access will
be revoked". Suppose a learner requests a u-lecture in the video format in a private
place and that the memory capacity of the mobile device is more than 5MB and
using a high bandwidth at the time of request which means that all pre-condition
requirements are met by current context. When the system gives the permission
to the learner in order to download the video format, she/he starts using a low
bandwidth network in attempting to download the video, which means that the on-
condition requirements to download this service are not hold based on u-learning
system policies. Therefore, the system adapts to this new situation by switching the
mobile device to a high bandwidth network in order to download this service.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the execution of Scenario 7: the subject sends the ac-
cess request containing the subject ID, the u-lecture in the video format and the
downloading right to the requesting ambient (line 1). The requesting ambient re-
ceives the access request and then checks the pre-authorisation, pre-obligation and
pre-conditions requirements pertaining to this request (lines 2-15). Here, the pre-
authorisation, pre-obligation and pre-conditions requirements are met and system
gives the permission to the learner to download the service (line 16). The ac-
cessing ambient receives the access request and then checks the on-authorisation,
on-obligation and on-condition requirements pertaining to this request during the
access line(19-24). As the bandwidth is low during the access(line 30), and it is not
allowed to access the video format in this context, the system has to adapt to a
new situation; it does so by sending the parameter Action1 with an access request
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Figure 5.10: Execution of Scenario 7
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to the onadapting ambient (lines 31-34) in order to switch to a high bandwidth.
Then, the onadapting ambient receives the current bandwidth of the network from
the HB ambient, which still low (line 34). This means the on-adaptation is fail and
the access is revoked (line 35-36).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the evaluation of CA-UCON model via real
world case study of ubiquitous learning system (u-learning system). We illustrate
how CA-UCON model properties can be validated using the execution environment
of CCA. We proposed some scenarios and run them in order to validate two main
property: safety and liveness properties.
In the following chapter 6, the architecture of CA-UCON reference monitor is
presented and the different types of enforcement architectures for CA-UCON model
are demonstrated.
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Enforcement of CA-UCON model
Objectives:
• Present Architecture of CA-UCON Reference Monitor.
• Present Enforcement Architectures of CA-UCON Model.
• Show different examples for enforcement architectures
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we demonstrate how the CA-UCON model will be enforced in a
system. Firstly, we propose the architecture of the CA-UCON reference monitor
(CA-UCON RM) and explain its main components. Secondly, we analyse the en-
forcement architectures for the CA-UCONmodel by discussing the three approaches,
namely: Centralised Enforcement Architecture, Distributed Enforcement Architec-
ture and Hybrid Enforcement Architecture. Finally, we show the difference between
these architectures in terms of enforcement of the CA-UCON RM, using examples.
6.2 Architecture of CA-UCON Reference Monitor
There have been some works conducted in term of usage control enforcement. In
spite of the short period of time from the time when the notion of usage control
was introduced, there are a lot of substantial efforts in order to create a appropriate
enforcement mechanisms. For instance, [87] proposed a new approach known as a
Trusted Reference Monitor (TRM in short) which is placed in client side in order to
enforce policies. So, the protocol that is used between TRM and application, as well
as between different TRMs is relied on challenge-response. Any access request from
receiver is followed by a challenge. The requester consequently confirms the applica-
tion, platform or environment throughout the means of a digital signature. Another
approach was proposed by [1] which is similar strategy to the above approach, it
is based on a hardware-based Trusted Platform Module (TPM in short) in order
to enforce usage policies on digital objects. It is known as self-enforcing objects
(SEOs in short) which is used as secure container for transferring objects and poli-
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cies and also has the ability to enforce the attached policies on any trusted platform
autonomously. Moreover, a similar enforcement approach was proposed by [66] to
explain the notion of platform attestation. The system ensures via a WS-Attestation
procedure that receiving platform must act correctly before the information is re-
leased. Hardware UCON Engine (HUE in short) is another enforcement approach
proposed by [61] which is a different from the above mentioned approaches. HUE is
considered as secure co-processor with a designated software stack in order to offer
integration with the operating system. Next, the RightEnforcer was proposed by
[3] which known as a product that is used to enforce simple usage control restric-
tions i.e. limiting the capability to view, copy, print and store. This approach is
incorporated in an e-mail user, so whenever a usage controlled object is delivered to
a receiver, the RightEnforcer encrypts the content and then sends the term of use
to a centralised RightServer. Then the receiver is forced to use the RightEnforcer
in order to be able to decrypt the content and so the policy is always enforced.
However, Majority of these enforcement approaches have been done in usage control
model (UCON).
Unlike the above UCON enforcement approaches, we propose an architecture of
the CA-UCON reference monitor (CA-UCON RM, in short) as depicted in Fig. 6.1,
where computing components are represented in a rectangular shape, data storage
in a cylindrical shape, and arrows indicate interactions between components. In the
following subsections, we explain in detail each component along with its role in this
architecture.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the CA-UCON Reference Monitor
6.2.1 Enforcement Point
The role of this component is to receive requests from the subject that wishes to
access an object and to issue decision requests to the decision point component in
particular to the usage decision (UD) component and to wait for the response from
it, whether PERMIT or DENY. It then lets the subject access the service if the
reply from decision point component is PERMIT; otherwise, it denies access to the
subject. This behaviour is typical to many access control models [84, 90].
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6.2.2 decision point
Unlike in other access control models [84, 90], this component consists of two parts,
usage decision (UD) component and adaptation decision (AD) component. The re-
sponsibility of the UD component is the evaluation of each access request that it
receives from enforcement point component. UD checks the authorization, obliga-
tion and condition requirements of each request in order to permit or deny the access
request. To do so, UD communicates with the attribute manager component in or-
der to acquire the values of the attributes of the subject, object and environment.
If all the requirements are met, UD responds by PERMIT to the enforcement point
component to allow the access to take place.
However, if the authorization and obligation requirements are met, but the con-
dition requirement is not fulfilled by the environment, UD communicates with the
AD component in order to adapt to the new situation. AD interacts with the con-
text information manager component to identify the current context of the subject,
object and environment. It then performs appropriate actions in an attempt to
make the environment meet the condition requirement. This attempt will last for
a specified period of time after which the adaptation will be deemed successful or
unsuccessful. If successful, the access request will be granted, otherwise it will be
denied.
6.2.3 Attribute Manager
The responsibility to this component is to provide access to the database of subject
and object attributes in order to use them in access decision. All subject and object
attributes will be stored in a database and updated as they change.
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6.2.4 Context Information Manager
This component is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the context information
such as subject context, object context and environment context. It uses a variety
of sensors to sense different types of contexts. It communicates with AD component
in order to provide the current context of the subject, object and environment.
6.3 Enforcement Architectures of CA-UCONModel
In this section, we present three different enforcement approaches in order to demon-
strate how the CA-UCON model can be implemented in real world situations. The
CA-UCON model can be enforced in a number of ways depending on the appli-
cation. These enforcement approaches are known as the centralized approach, the
distributed approach and the hybrid approach. The following subsection will ex-
plain each approach in detail to show the difference between these approaches, their
usages, and possible benefits/drawbacks.
6.3.1 Centralized Enforcement Architecture
A centralized architecture is dependent upon one node being designated as the com-
puter node or server. This node executes and runs the complete application locally
and all users share this central system. Hence control and failure is concentrated
in a single place, the server. The CA-UCON RM will be implemented in the server
side only. This entails control of the services being the responsibility of the server
alone as shown in Figure 6.2.
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How does this model support adaptation? The server is installed with a variety
of sensors which are able to record the context and behaviour of the subject, object
and environment. The adaptation to the new situation and sending of the appro-
priate service to the user will occur based on these contexts and behaviours. Thus,
adaptation required for any service will be initiated by the server. This is a strict
method of enforcement since all controls and adaptations are carried out centrally
on the server where CA-UCON RM is implemented.
The centralized architecture presents a number of benefits. Firstly, avoidance
of duplication. A centralised approach facilitates having a single version of any in-
formation system for the entire organisation. They also help to ensure that every
piece of data is stored only once. Secondly, sharing resources, since centralised sys-
tem holds the information utilized across the organisation in single place, allowing
access to it for all staff. This makes the undertaking of organisation-wide activities
more efficient and straightforward.
Central process and planning also permits well-suited technology and skills to be
established. The sharing of resources other than data is simplified. The transferral
between units of hardware, software and employees becomes easier. Finally, scale
economies are attained, since centralised approaches permit most activities to be
carried out with lower unit cost.
From amongst the disadvantages of the centralized architecture is heavy time
consumption, since carrying out actions and decisions centrally is additional time-
consuming than non- centralized approach. This is due to the extra time it takes to
assemble information from various different distributed places as input to centralised
system decisions. Furthermore, when the central computer or database system fails,
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then the system is inaccessible to anyone until the server/database recovers. Ad-
ditionally, rigidity and increased dependence and susceptibility are caused by the
centralized architecture.
Figure 6.2: Centralised Enforcement Architecture
The following example demonstrates how the CA-UCON RM has been enforced
in centralised architecture. We base our example on the case study mentioned in
the previous chapter.
6.3.1.1 Example 1:
Suppose a ubiquitous learning (u-learning) system that provides u-lectures in three
different formats: video, audio and text. The access to each format is restricted by
specific requirement on context of the user. If the user requests a u-lecture in the
video format when she/he is driving, the system will not deliver it to her/him in
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the video format, but it will deliver it in the audio format which is suitable to the
user current context (driving). In the centralised approach, the server may use a
location tracking technique to sense the context of the user (whether driving or not)
and then decide in what format the u-lecture must be delivered.
6.3.2 Distributed Enforcement Architecture
The distributed architecture can be understood in two distinct ways. It can be
defined by the physical components or defined from the angle of the user or compu-
tation. These are known as the physical view and the logical view respectively. A
distributed system is a set of nodes (computers or portable devices) connected by a
communication network. The nodes in the network do not share their memory and
are loosely coupled. The nodes in the system communicate via passing messages
over the communication network using communication protocols.
The logical model is the view that an application has of the system. It includes
a set of simultaneous processes and communication routes between them. The cen-
tre network is treated as completely linked. Communication of processes is done
by transferring messages to each other. The CA-UCON RM will be enforced in the
Mobile devices that will be responsible for observation of the context of the subject,
object and environment. It can control the service or adapt to a new situation based
on these contexts or behaviours as can be seen in Figure 6.3. In other words, the
distributed architecture admits the implementing of the CA-UCON RM without a
central unit to control and adapt the services.
The enforcement of distributed architecture exhibits a number of benefits. Promi-
nent amongst these is greater compatibility between systems and local needs, since
150
CHAPTER 6. ENFORCEMENT OF CA-UCON MODEL
users can develop their own information systems. These are more likely to corre-
spond with their needs than those developed by someone else. Another benefit is
greater system usage, as users show increased motivation by such approaches and
are thus more enthusiastic to adopt computing when it directly bolsters their own
interests, benefits and work. Finally, it supports quicker system development, since
the less the organisational distance between system user and system developer, the
swifter the development of that system is likely to be.
On the other hand certain negatives are displayed. This approach places barriers
to sharing data. Distributed approaches can produce information systems in indi-
vidual work units that are incompatible with each other and asynchronous. Further,
effort is duplicated, since units will often duplicate what others are doing. Therefore
distributed approaches tend to be very costly. Distribution can also lead to a failure
to achieve scale economies as activities are not pooled.
The example below illustrates how the CA-UCON RM has been enforced in
distributed architecture, which means that the control of services and adaptation
process will be done on the client side. We use the following example from the case
study mentioned in the previous chapter.
6.3.2.1 Example 2:
Following up from Example 1, suppose each u-lecture format requires some mini-
mum amount of free memory available on the user’s mobile device, e.g.: 5MB for a
video, 2MB for an audio, and 1MB for a text format. If a user requests a u-lecture in
video format and the available memory on her/his mobile device is less than 5MB,
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Figure 6.3: Distributed Enforcement Architecture
the system needs to adapt to this new situation. In a distributed enforcement ar-
chitecture where CA-UCON RM is installed on each mobile device, the adaptation
can be done e.g. by turning on a garbage collector software on the mobile device
(client side). This will eventually increase the size of available memory on the mobile
device. If enough memory has been freed and the current available memory on the
mobile device is greater than 5MB, then the adaptation is successful and access will
be granted.
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6.3.3 Hybrid Enforcement Architecture
Hybrid enforcement architecture is an interesting evolutionary architecture that has
combined features of centralised enforcement architecture and distributed enforce-
ment architecture. The purpose is to circumvent the disadvantages displayed by
these architectures whilst maintaining many of their advantages. In this architec-
ture the CA-UCON RM is enforced in both the client side and the server side as
can be seen in Figure 6.4.
Evaluation of the requested access right will take place on the mobile device side
or on the server side, or on both. This enables the controlling of service or adapt-
ing to a new situation to occur at any time anywhere without restrictions. Some
requested service accesses cannot be undertaken without adaptations from both the
server and client side. This is difficult to do in the previously discussed architec-
tures. On the other hand, the hybrid approach facilitates the implementation of the
CA-UCON policies in the real world on both server and client sides, enabling all
possible adaptations.
Hybrid architecture is a comprehensive and versatile approach. By combining
two different architectures, a third, more tailored architecture for the enforcement
of the CA-UCON RM has been evolved. Mobile devices and servers should be fitted
with a variety of sensors in order to monitor all contexts related to the subject,
object and environment. This is done so as to adapt to new situations and deliver
a suitable service for the majority of contexts. For example, if the user requests a
service in a certain context, but this service cannot be delivered in the given con-
text based on CA-UCON RM, the server can communicate with the mobile device
requiring it to adapt in order to receive a modified service.
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The advantages of the hybrid architecture include reliability, because a fault
detected in one part of the system can be isolated from the rest. Therefore the
necessary corrective measures can be carried out, without disturbing the operating
of any other part of the system. Furthermore, hybrid architecture displays more
flexibility than other architectures since it integrates the benefits of both central-
ized and distributed architectures optimizing the existing resources whilst avoiding
many drawbacks. On the other hand, the hybrid architecture involves a larger scale
of work and therefore is normally more costly.
The subsequent instance shows how the CA-UCON RM has been enforced in
the hybrid architecture. It can be seen that the control of services and adaptation
process will be done on both sides, on the server side and on the client side. We
present the following example based on the case study mentioned in the previous
chapter.
6.3.3.1 Example 3:
In the u-learning system described in Example 1 and Example 2 above, if the user
requests a u-lecture in video format when she/he is driving and the available mem-
ory size in her/his mobile device is less than 2MB, the system in this case needs
to adapt to the new situation by performing actions on both sides (server side and
client side). So, in the server side the system has to deliver the audio format instead
of video format based on the user context which is in this case, driving. Meanwhile,
the system has to check the amount of free memory available on the mobile device
prior to delivering the service, which in this case is less than 2MB, i.e. lower than
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Figure 6.4: Hybrid Enforcement Architecture
the minimum memory size requirement for accessing a u-lecture in audio format. In
this case the client side (mobile device) has to adapt as well, e.g. by executing a
garbage collector software in order to free more memory space. If both adaptation
actions are successful, then access will be granted; otherwise access will be denied.
In this scenario, CA-UCON RM is installed on both the server and the user mobile
device (client).
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6.4 Summary
This chapter has investigated the enforcement architectures of CA-UCON model.
We have introduced the architecture of CA-UCON reference monitor and explained
its components. Moreover, we have presented three different enforcement architec-
tures, discussing their advantages and disadvantages and the role of the CA-UCON
RM within each. Finally, we presented an example for each type of enforcement
architecture.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Objectives:
• Summaries the work in this thesis.
• Give the statement of evaluation
• List the main contributions of this research.
• Present future work that follows on from this thesis.
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7.1 Work Summary
Producing an adaptive usage control model that is suited a dynamic environment,
such as the Ubicomp environment, has been the ultimate aim of our work. This
is needed because of the new security challenges that have been introduced by the
Ubicomp environment, where information can be accessed and shared by users any-
time, anywhere. In a Ubicomp system, the context of the environment is considered
in order to control the service being requested and to adapt to any new situation.
Producing such an adaptive usage control model has been a challenging task, due
to the rapidly changing context of the Ubicomp environment, but the need for such
a model to address the demands of a dynamic environment and to overcome the
limitations of existing models has now been satisfied.
In meeting this goal, in this thesis we have proposed a context-aware and adaptive
usage control model (CA-UCON) that extends the traditional usage control model
(UCON) to enable adaptation to environmental changes with the aim of preserving
continuity of usage in a pervasive computing system. In this model, we integrated
the adaptation decision with the usage decision to generate a unified usage control
model that is context-aware. The adaptation decision considers different types of
contexts, such as the context of the subject, the object, the environment and the
ICT before and during the access. Moreover, the formal definitions of the two newly
introduced adaptation models within CA-UCON were presented: pre-adaptation
and on-adaptation.
We then proposed a computational model for CA-UCON in order to demonstrate
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how an access request on a resource is handled. This computational model was de-
scribed formally as a Finite State Machine (FSM), which gives a comprehensive
explanation of all the states and actions, in particular how and when the adaptation
takes place (both before and during the access). The development of CA-UCON as
an extension of UCON can be clearly seen from the FSM.
CCA was deemed the most appropriate formal notation for modelling and analysing
the CA-UCON model; it is a mathematical notation used for modelling a system
that is mobile and context-aware. We formally modelled CA-UCON using CCA
and analysed its properties via the execution environment of CCA for validation
purposes.
In order to assist in understanding the CA-UCON model and to evaluate its
performance, a real-world case study of a ubiquitous learning (u-learning) system
was presented. A modelling of this u-learning system in CA-UCON was given and
we formally specified the u-learning system using the CCA mathematical notations.
We then designed a number of scenarios and ran them using the CAA execution
environment in order to analyse certain properties within our CA-UCON model.
We then illustrated the enforcement architecture of the CA-UCON model in a
real situation. Firstly, we described a suitable reference monitor architecture and
described in detail its components as well as their behaviour. We then presented the
three types of enforcement architectures for CA-UCON and discussed their relative
advantages and disadvantages in ubiquitous environments. Finally, we used a num-
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ber of examples within ubiquitous environments in order to show in which situation
each architecture can be most appropriately enforced.
7.2 Statement of Evaluation
Several works have been done in the area of access control in order to remedy their
limitation in Ubicomp environment. Majority of these works have been conducted in
traditional access control models such as (RBAC) [26][62]. A few of these researches
have been accomplished in Usage control (UCON) model which is considered as
latest enhancement to traditional access control models [113][39]. However, none
of these extensions has wholly solved the limitation of access control models in
Ubicomp environment. Unlike the previous extensions, CA-UCON model enables
adaptation to environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access
by triggering specific actions to adapt to new situations and its main innovative
feature is the integration of continuity of usage decision and dynamic adaptation to
changes in the environmental or system context, so as to ensure continuity of usage.
In addition to data protection, CA-UCON model enhances the quality of services,
striving to keep explicit interactions with the user at a minimum.
In term of the formal specification used in this thesis, there are many existing for-
mal specification which support mobility and/or context-aware, but majority of
them were not appropriated in order to model context-aware mobile applications.
For instance, one of these formal specification is called CONAWA proposed by [50]
as calculus for applications that are context-aware, and this formal specification is
inspired by calculus. The CONAWA’s syntax concentrates on constructs that make
it probable to navigate and describe via context. Another formal specification was
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proposed by [65] which is known as Bigraphs, it is a unifying framework that used
to model concurrent mobile systems, but it does not support context-awareness.
Moreover, a UML specification of the infostation-based mLearning system was pro-
posed by [33]. Despite the fact that UML specification offers a number of benefits
like system analyses utilizing assistant tools and code generation, it has suffered
from the need of formal reasoning support which represent its limitation for the
design of critical systems. As consequence, we select CCA in order to model a
context-aware system, as it is a mathematical notation that support mobility and
context-awareness, as well as treats those primitive constructs as first-class citizens.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these formal specification or others
are used to model CA-UCON model.
Furthermore, regarding the case study that has been selected in this thesis, it
is provably correct. The case study is modelled rely on our CA-UCON model and
specified it utilizing the mathematical notation of CCA, then used the execution
environment of ccaPL in order to validate some property-based scenarios.
7.3 Success Criteria Revisited
To answer the research questions that we pointed out in Chapter 1, a Context-
Aware and Adaptive Usage Control model (CA-UCON in short) have been built
and evaluated throughout the thesis. The objective of this work was to integrated
the adaptation decision with usage decision in CA-UCON model to achieve a better
performance that suits the Ubicomp environment. The analysis of our proposed
model is presented using CCA and the validation of CA-UCON model properties is
illustrated via the execution of the devised scenarios.
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7.4 Contribution to Knowledge
The major contributions of the research in this thesis can be summarised as follows:
1. A context-aware and adaptive usage control model (CA-UCON) is developed,
which is an extension of the UCON model, in order to function in a highly
dynamic environment (ubiquitous environment) and to overcome the short-
coming of all previously proposed models.
2. An architecture of CA-UCON model is illustrated and comprehensive defini-
tion of its components are presented.
3. A computational model of CA-UCON is presented in order to demonstrate the
behaviour of the various states when an access request is submitted.
4. The formal specification of CA-UCON is presented using the mathematical
notations of CCA.
5. Formalising and analysing a real-world case study of ubiquitous learning (u-
learning) system are successfully undertaken.
6. Analyzing some properties of CA-UCON, via proposing some scenarios in the
u-learning environment and executing them through the execution environ-
ment of CCA, is achieved.
7. The possible enforcement architectures of the CA-UCON model are investi-
gated and their advantages and disadvantages are presented.
7.5 Future Work
The Usage Control (UCON) model is still an active research area in the field of secu-
rity; many issues remain to be considered, particularly with regard to the ubiquitous
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environment. According to this research done in this thesis, the first route for future
work is to extend our model to investigate further the enforcement mechanisms in
order to derive new techniques and algorithms. This would require extensive work
on security enforcement mechanisms in general and examining the existing proposed
enforcement mechanisms in a dynamic environment in particular.
Another avenue for future work is the real implementation of a u-learning system
using our CA-UCON approach for the purposes of further evaluation, where the
dynamic (context-aware) environment would require an adaptive usage control in
order to protect the resources and enhance the quality of services.
In terms of the extent of CCA, an additional route for future work is improving
the ccaPL execution environment animator in order to enhance its layout and to
enable any entity in the system to be visualised. This could be done by providing
highly developed animation for those entities and improving additional aspects in
the animation environment. In addition, there is a need for the model checker to be
developed and added to the execution environment; this is important for validating
any required specification of a system model. On the other hand, the CCA notation
is still being developing and several notations are still under construction; these
could be included in the syntax (for example, probability and time).
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